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Grounding Cavell’s work within the historical forces that shaped it is a curious task 
that each of the contributors to this issue is up to. We begin with a magisterial 
overview of Cavell’s writings on film and beyond (particularly his reading of George 
Cukor’s Gaslight (1944)), in multiple languages (counting footnotes), by Miguel 
Gomes Amorim. The historical lens here is certainly not linear, but centripetal, 
compounding layers of irony by building on Cavell’s insistence that we read gas as 
allegorical of film and hence of spirit, all three being ethereal — hence to read film as, 
ultimately, unable to achieve what philosophy has longed to do (that is, to join 
phenomenal and noumenal worlds) — though perhaps through historical re-visitings 
(hauntings), rather than dialectical uncovering, comes the true good of film. Next, we 
have an investigation into film’s indebtedness to opera by João Pedro Cachopo, who 
reminds us that according to Cavell even skepticism has more to do with a loss of 
voice and expressiveness, and hence the world, and that because of this trajectory of 
disillusionment, an agonistic battle between opera and film, in pursuing different 
means to reclaim that expression, ensues. Though João reminds us the latter (film) 
could not exist without the (failure of the) former. 
Moving away from film and toward philosophy, Peter Fosl similarly argues for 
skepticism’s indebtedness to David Hume, trying to infuse a Cavellian debate on 
skepticism with greater Humean purchase than perhaps is currently the norm in 
Cavellian scholarship. And from philosophy onto American studies, Rachel Malkin 
apprises us of the prevailing social, cultural, and intellectual climate of the 1960s and 
70s, particularly at UC Berkeley (where Cavell was affiliated until 1962), and, 
subsequently, Harvard (which included, for Cavell, a stint at Tougaloo College during 
the “Freedom Summer” in Mississippi). And lastly, the ghosts and echoes of Vietnam 
haunt Robert W. Tate’s Cavellian close reading of war sloganeering, past and present 
(i.e., “Support Our Troops”). From film, to opera, to philosophy, to American studies, 
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to ordinary language, Cavell belongs in and amongst many historical threads, or, 
perhaps many historical threads are worth picking up when attempting to historicize 
Cavell. We have merely scratched the surface here. 
 




(And if cinema can do what Kant could not do, 
then where does that place us?): 
Five Remarks on Two of Stanley Cavell’s  
Parenthetical Questions, or,  
The Remains of the Spectator’s Condition 





Of course — it is more or less the point of the enterprise — I begin 
with afterthoughts. 
CAVELL, Philosophical Passages 
 
[T]he underlying subject of what I take criticism to be is the subject 
of examples. I suppose it is the underlying subject of what I take 
philosophy as such to be. 
CAVELL, Themes Out of School 
 
I am assuming, that is, that criticism is inherently immodest and 
melodramatic [...]. 
CAVELL, Disowning Knowledge in Seven Plays of Shakespeare 
 
If there is melodrama here, it is everywhere in [Wittgenstein's Phi-
losophical] Investigations. 
CAVELL, This New Yet Unapproachable America 
 
At any rate, a theory of criticism will be part of a personal attach-
ment (including a theory of one’s attachment to theory, a certain 
trance in thinking). 
CAVELL, Pursuits of Happiness 
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[A]s if the origins of philosophy were hardly different in age from 
the origins of movies. 
CAVELL, In Quest of the Ordinary 
 
(What cloud of philosophy?) 
CAVELL, The Claim of Reason 
 
And the question is raised. 
It is not then answered. There is no answer, of the kind we think 
there is. No answer outside of us. 
CAVELL, Must We Mean What We Say? 
 
Because I evidently require such clouds of history in order to ad-
umbrate my conviction about these topics, let me at least avoid the 
appearance of thinking I have established more than is here. 
CAVELL, The World Viewed 
 
Cynics about philosophy, and perhaps about humanity, will find 
that questions without answers are empty; dogmatists will claim to 
have arrived at answers; philosophers after my heart will rather 
wish to convey the thought that while there may be no satisfying 
answers to such questions in certain forms, there are, so to speak, 
directions to answers, ways to think, that are worth the time of 
your life to discover. (It is a further question for me whether direc-
tions of this kind are teachable, in ways suited to what we think of 
as schools.) 
CAVELL, Themes Out of School 
 
So another question has arisen: What will it mean to be the reader 
of such a writer? 
CAVELL, The Senses of Walden 
 
(If you do not ask me, I know; if you ask me, I do not know). 
CAVELL, Must We Mean What We Say? 
 
What is film? 
CAVELL, The World Viewed 
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Then I would like to say that what I am doing in reading a film 
is performing it (if you wish, performing it inside myself). (I 
welcome here the sense in the idea of performance that it is the 
meeting of a responsibility.) 
CAVELL, Pursuits of Happiness 
 
Because what I want in writing philosophy [...] is to show that 
whatever discoveries are in store, they are not mine as opposed to 
yours, and in a certain sense not mine unless yours. 
CAVELL, Philosophical Passages 
 
What I found in turning to think consecutively about film about a 
dozen or so years ago was a medium which seemed simultaneously 
to be free of the imperative to philosophy and at the same time in-
evitably to reflect upon itself — as though the condition of philoso-
phy were its natural condition. And then I was lost. 
CAVELL, Themes Out of School 
 
What is film? What is a film? 
CAVELL, Contesting Tears 
 
[Thoreau’s] problem — at once philosophical, religious, literary, 
and, I will argue, political — is to get us to ask the questions, and 
then to show us that we do not know what we are asking, and then 
to show us that we have the answer. 
CAVELL, The Senses of Walden 
 
If we have earned the right to question it, the object itself will an-
swer; otherwise not. There is poetic justice. 
CAVELL, Must We Mean What We Say? 
 
The question remains: What makes philosophy possible? 
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1. A moving image of skepticism before Kant 
!
Stanley Cavell’s philosophical-historical definition of cinema as “a moving image of 
scepticism”1 finds what could very well be its most extraordinary contour in the con-
text of his 1988 Postscript to “Naughty Orators: Negation of Voice in Gaslight,” a 
reading of George Cukor’s Gaslight (1944) first presented as a conference in Jerusa-
lem (1986). 
 
Explanation of the connection between gaslight and spirit may be taken as the 
tenor of the explanation given by the cook Elizabeth when Paula, drained, 
manages to scream down the stairwell for Elizabeth to come up. Entering 
Paula's room and, in response to Paula’s question, assuring her that there’s no 
one in the house to cause any dimming, Elizabeth adds: “But the gas comes in 
pipes; and I expect there gets more gas in the pipes at some times than there 
does at others.” Paula sees the possibility: “Yes. Yes. I suppose that could ex-
plain it.” It does not explain the ensuing noises, however, and it does not really 
in itself match what calls for an explanation: it does not connect the specific 
conduits between the seen and the unseen. (And can film do what Kant could 
not do?2 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1. “Film is a moving image of skepticism: not only is there a reasonable possibility, it is a fact 
that here our normal senses are satisfied of reality while reality does not exist — even, alarmingly, be-
cause it does not exist, because viewing it is all it takes.” Cavell, The World Viewed: Reflections on the 
Ontology of Film (Enlarged Edition), (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979), 188-189. For 
the return of this definition in Cavell, see “What (Good) is a Film Museum? What is Film Culture?” 
(1983), in Cavell on Film, ed. William Rothman (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), 
110; and “What Photography Calls Thinking,” in Cavell on Film: 118. For a (too) brief commentary on 
the definition's implication in Cavell’s thought on film, see William Rothman & Marian Keane. Read-
ing Cavell’s The World Viewed: A Philosophical Perspective on Film (Detroit: Wayne State University, 
2000), 68. 
2. Cavell, Contesting Tears: The Hollywood Melodrama of the Unknown Woman (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1996), 75. Cavell is alluding here to Kant’s distinction between nomenon and 
phenomenon presented in Critique of Pure Reason. See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason: 
Unified Edition (with all the variants from the 1781 and 1787 editions), trans. Werner S. Pluhar, intr. 
Patricia Kitcher (Cambridge, MA: Hackett Publishing Company, 1996). For a preamble to the logic and 
implications of this distinction, see Rudolf Eisler. Kant-Lexikon, II, trans. Anne-Dominique Balmès 
and Pierre Osmo (Paris: Gallimard/Tel, 2011), 745-748. Regarding certain placements of Kant in Cav-
ell’s thought, a longer study would have to confront the vast question of a certain reconfiguration of 
Kant through Emerson, as well as Kant with Poe. See Cavell. “Emerson’s Constitutional Amending: 
Reading ‘Fate,’” in Philosophical Passages: Wittgenstein, Emerson, Austin, Derrida (Oxford & Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1995), 20, 29, 32; “Being Odd, Getting Even (Descartes, Emerson, 
Poe)”, in In Quest of the Ordinary. Lines of Skepticism and Romanticism (Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press, 1988), 122. In “Knowledge as Transgression. It Happened One Night,” Frank Capra’s film 
CONVERSATIONS 3  
 
7!
Cavell raises this extraordinary question in the context of a description of the “para-
normal” phenomena provoked by Gregory (Charles Boyer) in order to drive his wife 
Paula (Ingrid Bergman3) mad, and alongside this peculiarly interrogative connection 
of Kant and cinema reconfigured as a revision of the film’s “allegory of spirit,”4 there 
also lingers the suggestion that this allegory could say something (maybe even a lot) 
about the parenthetical question. On the other hand, what is markedly philosophical 
about the film’s events becomes clearer the moment one acknowledges that the par-
enthetical question rises before a narrative of detours conceded as an allegorical, and 
hence political, melodrama.5 As a posthumous and parenthetical diversion in the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
also presents a peculiar opportunity to reconfigure the issue of Kantian conditions. See Cavell. Pur-
suits of Happiness: The Hollywood Comedy of Remarriage (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1981), 99. In another direction, it would also be relevant to confront Cavell’s Kant with the se-
vere reappraisal of Critique of Pure Reason conducted by Maurizio Ferraris. See Ferraris, Goodbye 
Kant! Cosa resta oggi della Critica della ragion pura (Milano: Bompiani, 2004). 
3. For Carlos Clarens, Gaslight is above all concerned with “the basic premise of a couple 
bound together by madness as much as by marriage vows.” See Clarens, George Cukor (London: 
Secker and Warburg/British Film Institute, 1976), 79. 
4. See Cavell, Contesting Tears, 73. Regarding the question of allegorical functions, it would be 
necessary to study the vast implications of the recurrent rhetoric of the allegory in Cavell’s thought. 
Contesting Tears includes one of several examples concerning cinema and allegories: “I have formu-
lated the field of feminine communication effected by the film screen, as allegorized by the lit window 
at the end of [King Vidor’s] Stella Dallas, as a search for the mother’s gaze.” See Cavell, Contesting 
Tears, 214-215. For two other examples of allegorical placements, see Cavell, Philosophical Passages: 
Wittgenstein, Emerson, Austin, Derrida (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 147, 181. 
5. Although the question of history does not seem to occupy a preeminent place in Stanley 
Cavell’s thought, the diversified recurrence of its issue is constant throughout all of his books, from the 
use of the term “history” to the very relevant meditations on slavery and the atomic bomb (it remains 
however to be seen if those allusions and references are enough to (re)compose Cavell's thought as a 
historical one). As a set of examples, The World Viewed is particularly relevant. See Cavell, The World 
Viewed, xx, xxiv, xxv; 4; 8, 11-12, 21, 25, 36, 48, 56, 71, 60-62, 66, 72, 81, 105, 110, 114, 165, 167, 195, 
197, 210, 214-215, 217-218, 225, 230. With particular relevance to any reading of Cavell's reading of 
Gaslight, the following considerations from the “End of the Myths” chapter have a particular weight in 
relation to Ingrid Bergman’s performance. “One recalls further that the leading women of the Bogart 
character — Mary Astor, Ingrid Bergman, Lauren Bacall — while two of them have been among the 
most desirable public women of our time, are each possessed of an intelligence that gives them an in-
dependence from men, hence makes them worth winning, worth yielding independence for.” See Cav-
ell, The World Viewed, 63. 
Later on, Cavell very precisely connects the issue of a star’s filmography (let's say, a certain po-
litique de l’actor et de l’actrice) with “the internal history of the world of cinema”: “(The outlaw past 
underlying the Bogart character is only the purest instance of a familiar route: the interpretation of 
lawman and outlaw winds through figures as various or distant as James Cagney and Lloyd Nolan and 
Howard Duff. Their histories become part of what the movies they are in are about. So an account of 
the paths of stars across their various films must form part of the internal history of the world of 
cinema.)” See Cavell, The World Viewed, 71. These remarks also lead in the direction of Contesting 
Tears, particularly when it comes to Ingrid Bergman’s photogenesis: “So the question becomes: How 
has this star, this human figure of flesh and blood, call her Ingrid Bergman, called upon the camera to 
lend her this transfiguration? Part of the answer would be to say what a star is, what it is about such 
human beings that invites this favorable photogenesis. It is not knowable a priori, but this film should 
be consulted on the matter.” See Cavell, Contesting Tears, 70. 
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reading of an “allegory of sprit,” the question “(And can film do what Kant could not 
do?)” has therefore already been exposed to a system of thought regulated by the is-
sue and definition of cinema as “a moving image of skepticism,” i.e., a condition that 
cannot be mastered by either rules or means, Kant or cinema (itself), without sooner 
or later drawing them into further questions (as well as, inevitably, categories),6 but 
which also implies that no strains of this question can preclude a historical role for its 
allegorical value (an ordering similar to a history conceding itself a further gesture, in 
this particular case in the form of a Postscript). And that is to say that as a certain 
contour of this “allegory of sprit,” the parenthetical question could also be displaced 
as an allegory of an allegory (a spirit of a spirit?) and be repeated under the aegis of 
cinema as “a moving image of skepticism” (for instance as if there where no essence 
of this allegory other than the one displaced alongside Cavell’s history of reading Gas-
light).7 
The question, therefore, implies not only what will become of this “allegory of 
sprit” as its end in the context of a re-reading of Gaslight, but also the possibility of 
raising other questions before this parenthetical one; for example: 1) How can cinema 
be delineated by orderings when its cases can be altered, deformed, displaced, de-
composed, and reformed by conditions that no longer obey a strictly cinematographic 
status?;  2) How does in fact a ghost story survive (by) (itself) as an allegory, and can 
its end survive besides a posthumous re-inscription without reclaiming its narrative 
condition?  3) What happens to the gas-like traces of the parenthetical question, par-
ticularly if one disregards the silliness of what some would feebly term “the pure vi-
sion of a film” (one that very likely knew as little about its own history as it did about 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
As for the relation of cinema with the political, only one quote among many possible ones: 
“The myth of movies replaces the myth according to which obedience to the law, being obedience to 
laws I have consented to and thus established, is obedience to the best of myself, hence constitutes my 
freedom — the myth of democracy. In replacing this myth, it suggests that democracy itself, the sacred 
image of secular politics, is unliveable.” See Cavell, The World Viewed, 214. It would however be nec-
essary to consider if this gesture of substitution should not also imply the refusal to use the term 
“myth,” unless its use is too dependent upon Cavell's history as a (strict) spectator. 
6. The issue of categories and allegories in relation to Film history is presented in Amorim. A 
Catallegory Fatigue Sampler for an Im-pertinent History of Cinema, take one (unpublished, 2013); 
“Notes for the re-inscription of Plato’s The Republic and Aristotle’s Politics before Film Theory.” Re-
vista Portuguesa de Filosofia, 69/3 (2013), 583-610. 
7. In that sense, it would also be necessary to reconsider Gaslight’s repositioning in other 
books. See Cavell, A Pitch of Philosophy: Autobiographical Exercises (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1994), 134-136; Cities of Words: Pedagogical Letters on a Register of the Moral Life 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 102-118, 208, 285 (in this instance as a counter-
shot to John Stuart Mill). 
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a supposed history of cinema as a whole, since it is far too obvious that any proposed 
purity remains a puerile trend)? 
If the question “(And can film do what Kant could not do)” is indeed a possible 
actualization of Kant’s philosophy through cinema, then it not only concerns Cavell’s 
Gaslight re-reading as an “allegory of sprit,” but also directs the figure of gas accord-
ing to which the film organizes itself as it leads each of its repositions in the direction 
of a “spectral” agent interrupting female sanity (particularly when this possibility is 
interfered with by the parenthetical detour of the question). The question not only 
provides an immeasurable pause in the Postscript, but works as if it were a suspen-
sion which, related to gas, also turns it into a condition which bears the question (and 
which up to a certain point counter-inscribes Gaslight “itself”). But if the question 
that this Postscript bears is indeed a detour through the “figure” of gas, it also com-
plies with the matter of the question designating a philosophical-historical pause for 
cinematographic possibilities alongside the issue of a gas that, although it does not 
belong to the significant traits of the visible in a strict sense, does indeed belong to 
the traits of Cavell’s reading of it (at least within the corpus presented in Contesting 
Tears as a set of pauses and interruptions). 
Alongside the “figure” of gas, the parenthetical question belongs to those traits 
of Stanley Cavell's philosophy (one could almost be tempted say, (almost) an affirma-
tively conventional materiality) which, as the suspension of philosophically deter-
mined writing, remain accessible for its reading beside both Gaslight and cinema as 
“a moving image of skepticism” (a definition which, without remaining the same, can 
be repeated, declined, and inflected by certain (nearly) pornographic markings of the 
melodrama). The question thus concerns not only a “melodramatic” pause that an-
nounces no ready(-made) answer, but also complies with the shots in Gaslight were 
the question of gas assigns to this re-reading the status of both a parenthesis and a 
melodrama displaced before and within the question. (The parenthetical question 
does not imply or mean a digression analogous to a footnote in the so-called main 
text, rather the condition of a re-reading marked by a detour in which gas can be in-
flected as a repetition — a gesture, therefore, that comes into consideration not so 
much as a final revision but as a bearer of its cinematographically historical possibili-
ties).  
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2. Before the spectrator’s condition 
 
Taking into consideration another parenthetical question in the Postscript, the entire 
movement of the film can also be described as a gesture proceeding from what could 
be termed the spectrator.8 
 
The extent to which, or sense in which, such domestic melodramas are ghost 
stories — a matter coming to another head, in Ibsen, in Ghosts — is laid out in 
the question the detective asks the constable after they have followed Gregory 
only to have him disappear into the fog, like a ghost: “You don’t suppose he 
could have gone into his house do you? [...] Why should a man walk out of his 
own house, all the way around the corner, just to get back where he started 
form?” If we translate this as: “Why would he wish to enter his house unseen?” 
the answer is irresistible: in order to haunt the house, which is a way of inhab-
iting it. Here the path is opened for considering Paula to be responding to 
lowering lamps and noises in the attic as to a ghost story, or ghost play. (Then 
where does that place us?)9 
 
The probing anxieties about a suspicious act that may very well turn out to be an ex-
cuse to become a ghost at one’s so-called own house — but would that imply, or at 
least provide, the means or the ends of this “allegory of sprit”? — and concern the 
functions of gas as it turns Paula into the “recipient” of gaseous repetitions, but also 
prevent her from fully being (there) for others, and, in particular, the spectrator(s) 
implied in the question “(Then where does that place us?).” As a renewal of Cavell's 
reading, this other parenthetical question also expands his definition of cinema with-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8. In several moments of his books, Cavell concedes the possibility of the reader as a fantasti-
cal figure with implications that ought to be amplified in the direction of the cinematographic specta-
tor. See, e.g., Cavell, In Quest of the Ordinary, 184. The implications of this possibility are developed 
in a work-in-progress titled A Brief Cinematographic Critique of the Spect(r)ator’s Reason, where 
some examples from the recurrent gesture of haunting in Cavell’s thought are considered alongside 
formulations from the early media reception of cinema after its so-called invention by the Lumière 
brothers, Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Gilles Deleuze, Laurence Rickels, and Enrico 
Ghezzi. The issue of the fantastical reader in Cavell, on the other hand, leads into one of several con-
siderations regarding Sigmund Freud's take on the Copernican revolution. The implications of this 
gesture are developed in another work-in-progress titled Candidates, Castings, And Variants for a 
Permanent Copernican Revolution. 
9. See Cavell, Contesting Tears, 73-74. 
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out concluding it, particularly if one considers this melodrama as a rhythmic se-
quence of gas traces displaced in-between (nearly) nothing, fire, and its extinction. 
Furthermore, what could be termed the melodrama of the spectrator announces 
through this other question a peculiar re-entry into the film, for the spectrator stands 
before a re-reading of Gaslight he (it?) was unable to conclude once and for all.10 A 
reading of gas as the condition for this other question, therefore, can be stated as a 
re-reading that aims at this “allegory of sprit” but only as the pause in which the 
melodrama of the spectrator conditions this act in order to assert its (re)condition 
without any horizontal end(s) for both questions. At the same time, this gesture as a 
skeptical claim is amplified in the typographical space of the parenthesis by a move-
ment that can no longer be dominated by straight intentions, since the question of 
the spect(r)ator is crossed by gas as a condition to which it is exposed, even as it is 
split apart. 
Within the parenthetical question, both Gaslight, gas, and the spectrator are 
displaced alongside what the articulation of the question could not manage as subject 
or theme (or which, in another sense, it cannot re-state without reclaiming a possible 
answer), therefore preventing the thematically formal illustration of a gas whose odd-
ity can only mark the suspension of any gaze. By means not only of both parenthetical 
questions but also of what Cavell terms “variations,”11 every element of this re-
reading of Gaslight retrospectively becomes the condition for both a suspension and 
a suspended relation in which the “variations” retain the gesture which they pervade 
(this relation of the suspension of their relation to both the reading and the paren-
thetical questions thus remains able to be affected by its themes and movements as a 
consequential problem). The “variations” are also a “variation”: they suspend and 
give themselves up, hardly different from the spectrator’s disfiguration in a medium 
of both ghostly and mundane designation (in a way, the spectrator questions his (its?) 
possibility while articulating the exorbitant theme of gas as both surplus, ascent, dis-
tance, spatial and temporal indetermination for a melodrama re-cast as an allegorical 
trait).  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10. A gesture somewhat dissimilar from Fredric Jameson’s claims about his spectatorship sig-
nature: “I may also say that this kind of analysis also resembles Freud's mainly in the way in which, 
when successful, it liquidates the experience in question and dissolves them without a trace; I find I 
have no desire to see again a movie about which I have written well.” See Jameson, Signatures of the 
visible (London: Routledge, 1990), 3-4. 
11. See Cavell, Contesting Tears, 73. 
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Furthermore, the re-entry of the question between cinema and Kant, as well as 
the virtual impossibility of closing both the two parenthesis and the 1986 reading 
(let’s say, the space in-between both these questions and Cavell’s re-reading of Gas-
light as a counter-crypt), are already indicated on the near side of other statements 
concerning the film.12 And if the parenthetical questions remain at the edge of both 
visibility and readability, that happens because at the very least they are concerned 
with the activity of gas as it makes common cause with the house as a marital space 
and impart their dispersed effects without assembling them into the identifiable unity 
of a form. The counter-crypt thus makes common cause with the gas as the stalling of 
parenthetical questions in their positing, as well as with the accident of cinema as a 
philosophical-historical instance where Cavell's brand of skepticism can remain dis-
played. This way, the questions make common cause with Gaslight since they are 
concerned not only with what, in a certain “Kantian” reading, seems to remain inac-
cessible, but also with a ruptured and partial cinematographic haunting of cinema by 
philosophy. (The re-reading can be interrupted, no doubt, but only because Gaslight 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12. Not only the references to the Foucault-Derrida Cartesian polemos (Cavell, Contesting 
Tears, 61-65), but particularly, in view of the history of Cavell’s thought, J.L. Austin’s “Other Minds.” 
See Austin, “Other Minds,” in Philosophical Papers: Third Edition, ed. J. O. Urmson and G. J. War-
nock (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 76-116. For references to Austin’s “Other Minds,” see 
Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say?: A Book of Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1969), 39, 58; The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 1979), 49, 132-133, 224, 240; Pursuits of Happiness, 119; In Quest of the Ordi-
nary, 51, 68, 83, 161; A Pitch of Philosophy, 97; Disowning Knowledge in Seven Plays of Shakespeare, 
updated edn. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 201; Cities of Words, 80; Philosophy 
the Day After Tomorrow (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 195; Little Did I Know: 
Excerpts From Memory (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 320, 359. It would however be 
necessary to infer if references to “other minds” which do not explicitly allude to Austin's text are in-
dependent from that frame. In this regard, see The Claim of Reason, 86, 425; The Senses of Walden: 
An Expanded Edition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981), 119; In Quest of the Ordinary, 
55; Contesting Tears, 90.  
In The Claim of Reason, the issue of alterity is very precisely asserted as a historical issue: 
“The idea is that the problem of the other is discovered through telling its history. Then how could this 
history be recounted; what would it be a recounting of?” See Cavell, The Claim of Reason, 468. In an-
other direction, “the history of the other” ought to be confronted with the following definition of his-
tory: “I might ask how it is that we have recovered from such outbreaks of irrationality, which dot the 
religious history, i.e., the history, of the Judeo-Christian world” (The Claim of Reason, 422). For the 
minimal elements in the Foucault-Derrida dossier see:  Michel Foucault, Histoire de la folie à l'âge 
classique [1961] (Paris: Tel/Gallimard, 1977), 56-59; “Mon corps, ce papier, ce feu” [1972] in Dits et 
écrits I, 1954-1975, ed. Daniel Defert and François Ewald with Jacques Lagrange (Paris: Quar-
to/Gallimard, 2001), 1113-1136; “Retour sur la Première Méditation de Descartes” [1973], ed. Philippe 
Artières et al, Cahiers de l’Herne: Foucault (Paris: L’Herne, 2011), 92-94. On Derrida’s side, see “Cogi-
to et histoire de la folie” [1964], in L’écriture et la différence [1967] (Paris: Seuil, 1979) 51-97. This po-
lemos was later restaged as Derrida & Freud vs. Foucault in “«Être juste avec Freud» : L’histoire de la 
folie à l’âge de la psychanalyse”. See Derrida, Résistances de la psychanalyse (Paris: Galilée, 1996), 
89-146. 
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also provides this interruption in order that the second parenthetical question as the 
condition for a spect(r)ator can support the counter-crypt of both an indissoluble clo-
sure and a rational reason for gas — as if both were to be interrupted not by an act of 
arbitrariness, but only by an interval from which no final meaning for an autonomous 
spectrator may be adjoined.)  
On the other hand, one could also consider that the parenthetical questions 
precede the re-reading as the borderline position of the spectrator in order to request 
both its contour and the issue of shots that concern a cinematographic thought. In 
that sense, the counter-crypt regards history as a conditional allegory, and since its 
condition has been contracted as both the measure for its survival and disappearance, 
this interval, in order to be itself at all, must indeed materialize itself as an “allegory 
of spirit.” Furthermore, since this provision of the counter-crypt before an allegory is 
(almost) immanent, at least if it has to be there for the remains of the film, it also 
complies with its subtraction before the precarious possibility of a history for an alle-
gory. (If it were not the subtracted delay of its transience, gas as an allegory could 
never “be,” since only under the condition that it be slightly more than gas as an alle-
gory can it survive as the condition for the two questions’ counter-crypt — after all, its 
condition is only given retrospectively by its ending as history, maybe even before the 




3. Before the signature effect of an auto(cine)bio(thanato)graphy 
 
Since the rupture of the first parenthetical question is preceded by the reconsidera-
tion of an “allegory of sprit,” it also provides a certain disclosure concerning the be-
lated recognition which is imparted by it, particularly as it is linked to the recognition 
of the economy of both the 1986 Jerusalem conference and the events of Gaslight. 
 
The allegory of spirit through images and consequences of gaslighting may, if 
it does not put one off, put one on to wanting some (further) explanation of the 
connection. (The founding connection, for the work represented in my text, is 
always the fate of spirit as the fate of voice; so that strangulation and vampir-
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ism — the victimization, respectively, of the aunt and of Paula — are psychi-
cally linked thefts, say of freedom, or separateness, difference.)13 
 
Since this “allegory of spirit” provided the reading of Gaslight with conditions to 
which Cavell did not hesitate to attribute the impact of symptomatically historical 
moments,14 the Postscript would have merely had the slight significance of recol-
lected intentions, were it not that it is factually grounded in the conference’s text and 
could be re-read as a further occasion to work out the film. But it is not only Gas-
light's events that are conjured up in it; more precisely, it is their condition as it sur-
vives through what Cavell (re)cites as his (its?) re-reading's counter-crypt: a cinema-
tographic condition of gas-like effects, or, in short, of cinema before (its) history. 
(What speaks in both parenthetical questions as the signature effect of the spectrator 
named Stanley Cavell concerns cinema in regard to a case such as Gaslight, but does 
so since the film (still) can be shown beyond itself.) 
The Postscript, reciting a previous reading which in a way designates itself at 
(as?) the limit of a phenomenal cognition concerning, but not only, the issue of a 
ghostly gas, therefore contains this “allegory of spirit” as the condition for the two 
parenthetical questions that it must (re)cite in order to recompose itself as if its con-
ditions were limited by a fictional status. And since gas in Gaslight can indeed be re-
garded as an allegorical figure, its occurrences as partings from this film do not re-
duce it to a ghostly ghost film (of (redundant) ghosts, as if they could be reduced to a 
single referent within a historically describable context), but are misaligned before 
the counter-crypt as if this “allegory of spirit” were more than a referential, maybe 
even reverential, end misplaced as the withdrawal of the film’s apparent theme. It 
therefore concerns not only a film which seems to be “about” gas and ghosts, but 
stands for the trace of a cinema that, in the wake of Kant’s philosophy as read by Cav-
ell, comprises a counter-crypt that is no longer, or maybe even not yet, death or the 
condition of the film “itself.”15 The two question’s counter-crypt, as if detached from 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13. Cavell, Contesting Tears, 73. 
14. Ibid., 76. 
15. In this direction, it is certainly not accidental that another extraordinary moment concern-
ing Cavell’s approach to cinema takes place in the last pages of Little Did I Know in the form of a rap-
prochement between Howard Hawk’s Only Angels Have Wings (1939) and Maurice Blanchot’s 
L’Écriture du désastre. See Cavell, Little Did I Know, 545-546; and Blanchot, L’Écriture du désastre 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1980). This gesture, on the other hand, urgently needs to be amplified according to 
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itself, concerns both the end of this “allegory of spirit” and the condition that it out-
lasts, both as a departure from the possibility of a meaning reduced to gas and its 
eventual return (or: both the subtraction of the spectrator and the trace he (it?) leaves 
behind,16 except and very precisely as a parenthetical question). 
The Postscript rephrases the conference but does not reduce all the cinema-
tographic instances that could be imagined, foretold or anticipated before (“Kantian”) 
pasts that cannot be exceeded by a further (strictly cinematographic?) future of, and 
for, cinema as a philosophical question. The two questions therefore remain before 
the history of a spectrator, one whose skepticism also concerns the re-entry of fini-
tude, and, regarding both the film and the conference, what remains of their disap-
pearance (as) (and before) the Postscript. (As he re-reads his conference, Cavell also 
survives its historical context so that he can comply with an almost endless series of 
revisions as moments of a life dedicated to the (necessarily) provisory 
auto(cine)bio(thanato)graphy of a spectrator).17  
As a particular textual instance, the Postscript provides the way to an allegori-
cal condition that has overtaken both cinema and history (extended both into what 
cinema, Gaslight, and the conference are meant to say), and doubles (as) a re-reading 
that splits its elements into a gas-like outline confronting itself with what is meant in 
it as the (re)citation of irreducibly parenthetical questions (not forgetting other cine-
matographic cases that may be concerned with it as pathways to “the whole of 
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what Cavell considers to be a peculiarly skeptical trait in Blanchot’s thought (Little Did I Know, 528), 
and furthermore ought to take into consideration the only three films explicitly referred to by Blanchot 
throughout his writings: Frédéric Rossif’s Le temps du ghetto (1961); Marguerite Duras’ Détruire, dit-
elle (1969); Claude Lanzmann’s Shoah (1985). See Blanchot, “Le cours du monde” [1960-1964] in 
Écrits Politiques 1953-1993, ed. Éric Hoppenot (Paris: Gallimard, 2008), 121; “Détruire”, in Maurice 
Blanchot et al, Marguerite Duras (Paris, Albatros, 1975), 100; “N’oubliez pas!” [La Quinzaine Lit-
téraire nº 459, 16 March 1986], in Blanchot.  La Condition critique. Articles, 1945-1998, ed. Christo-
phe Bident (Paris: Gallimard, 2010), 433;  “L’écriture consacré au silence” [Instants nº 1, 1989], in 
Blanchot, ibid. 433. In an interview published in the issue of Cahiers de l’Herne focusing on Blanchot, 
Jacqueline Laporte describes the writer as someone with quite classical tastes in terms of cinema. See 
Jacqueline Hoppenot (Paris: L’Herne, 2014), 102. 
16. “Les films ne parlent que d’absence présente.” See Cavell “Le cinéma colle à la peau de 
l’Amérique: Entretien avec Stanley Cavell (par Antoine de Baecque),” Cahiers du cinéma hors-série: 
Le siècle du cinéma (November 2000): 58. 
17. A spectral autobiography recomposed in-between cinema and films. “Le temps était venu 
de produire des réponses qui signifieraient quelque chose. Soudain j'ai eu besoin de cela. C'est alors 
que j'ai commencé à aller au cinéma seul.” See Cavell, “Le cinéma colle à la peau de l’Amérique: Entre-
tien avec Stanley Cavell (par Antoine de Baecque),” 59. 
“Je n’ai plus cette impulsion proprement physiologique qui me poussait à aller au cinéma. Je 
vais désormais voir un film.” See Cavell, “Stanley Cavell: un philosophe au cinéma (entretien par Jean-
Loup Bourget et Marc Cerisuelo),” Positif 464 (October 1999), 190. 
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cinema,” whatever that could possibly mean and include). The fact that the Postscript 
counter-inscribes the questions among other instances of textual hauntings (Kant, 
Ibsen,18 Freud, Austin, Derrida vs. Foucault...) and, moreover, that structurally it is 
(almost) nothing other than a self-proliferating reciting of a (previous) reading, also 




4. Before further allegories 
 
This suggestion is confirmed by Gregory’s last accusation of Paula, that her 
madness is inherited from her mother, who, he claims to have discovered, died 
in an insane asylum — himself now the fabricator of a ghost story, fictionaliz-
ing Paula's history as well as her perceptions. (In not considering Gregory’s 
own story, I am not considering the extent to which he seems to come to be-
lieve his fabrications.) Paula said to Gregory the morning after their wedding 
night that her mother died in giving birth to her, and that she never knew her 
father. it is a very questionable tale, not to say a haunting one, since Paula’s 
“aunt” might have had her reasons for telling Paula the story: it could cover 
such a fact as that Paula’s mother was indeed mad; or the fact that Paula is the 
“aunt’s” child, whom it would have been most inconvenient for a famous ac-
tress, in a secret liaison with a royal figure, to acknowledge as hers (as theirs?). 
But the question for us is what Paula thinks of the story, why she speaks of it 
as knowing no more than these few words about so massive a matter of her 
life. she attaches great feeling and significance to the memory of her aunt’s 
going over for her, on special occasions, the stories associated with her collec-
tion of theatrical mementos; but the child seems not to have asked about, nor 
to have had, mementos associated with the figure she calls her mother. As if 
she does not feel she has the right to know something, or as if he already 
knows something. Now consider again: Who does Paula know to be in the 
attic? And before all: Who did she know was there before she knew? And who 
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18. See Henrik Ibsen, Ghosts, trans. Michael Meyer (New York: Dover Thrift Editions, 1997). 
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am I to want to know what Paula knows — to speculate, for example, about 
Freud’s observation, in discussing second marriages in his 1931 essay “Female 
Sexuality,” that a woman’s problems with her (first) husband will repeat her 
problems — Freud says, “disappointments” — with her mother. (A poltergeist 
is a ghost that manifests itself by noises and rappings. Evidently also by 
thumps and scraping. It stems from a word meaning to cry out.)19 
 
Although the “spectral” attacks directed by Gregory against his wife under the form of 
gaslighting can be framed as a patriarchal gesture within this “allegory of the spirit,” 
this possibility leads Cavell not only to the recognition of a modification within a his-
tory of marital relations, but to the experience of the particular means and ends of 
this family history. The death of the mother as a probable cause for the exhaustion of 
those means alongside the stalling of marriage comes under the form of a connection 
between “to haunt,” Paula's aunt, and a right to speculation taking its cue from Sig-
mund Freud's “Female Sexuality.”20 If one concedes that this re-reading of Gaslight 
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19. See Cavell, Contesting Tears, 74-75. 
20. See Sigmund Freud, La vie sexuelle, introduction by Jean Laplanche, trans. Denise Berger 
et al. (Paris: PUF, 1969), 139-155. Besides Cavell’s allusion to Freud’s “Female Sexuality” (ibid: 75), one 
should also take into account another parenthetical moment in the Introduction to Contesting Tears: 
“If we thereupon take as an answer to the sublimer question, What does a woman want? that what she 
wants is to be known, or to know that her separateness is acknowledged, we may see the epistemologi-
cal mismatch for which the genders have been headed: whatever will count as her being known — and 
I suppose this is quite undefined — it is precisely not to be satisfied by her having at once to tell and 
not to tell what she knows. At best this changes the subject.” (19-20). And: “In thus raising the ques-
tion, What does the woman want to know and to be known? The suggestion is lodged that the answer 
may be more than men can imagine on their own. (Should I rather say?: what the feminine wants 
known is more than the masculine can imagine. This seems at once trivial and evasive.)” (Contesting 
Tears, 23). 
As a preliminary approach to this (very likely) endless question, see Shoshana Felman, What 
Does a Woman Want? Reading and Sexual Difference (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University 
Press, 1993). For its counter-shot, see Felman, Le Scandale du corps parlant: Don Juan avec Austin, 
ou, la séduction en deux langues (Paris: Seuil, 1980), as well as the reissue of the English translation 
and its replacement in-between a foreword by Stanley Cavell and an afterword by Judith Butler. See 
Felman, The Scandal of the Speaking Body: Don Juan with J. L. Austin, or Seduction in Two Lan-
guages, trans. Catherine Porter (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002); Cavell, “Foreword to The 
Scandal of the Speaking Body”, in Felman, The Scandal of the Speaking Body, xi-xxi; and Judith But-
ler, “Afterword”, in Felman, The Scandal of the Speaking Body, 113-123. Stephen Mulhall’s introduc-
tion to Cavell’s reading of Shakespeare’s King Lear, “Prologue: The Avoidance of Love (The Abdication 
Scene)” (from Must We Mean What We Say?) presented in The Cavell Reader rightly places the issue 
of gender and skepticism as a de facto recurrent concern in Cavell’s thought. See Cavell, The Cavell 
Reader, ed. Stephen Mulhall (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 22-23. 
Furthermore, one should also pursue the relation between that question and the issue of gen-
ders and skepticism as presented in the chapter from Contesting Tears focusing on Max Ophüls’ Letter 
from an Unknown Woman (1948), “Psychoanalysis and Cinema: Moments of Letter from an Un-
known Woman” (Contesting Tears, 101), and then reframe it in-between Jean-Luc Nancy’s peculiarly 
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displaces the appropriation of events by Gregory in regard to the authoritative stance 
of a patriarchal insanity, then the husband's measures do conform to the power to 
project and control through “strangulation and vampirism” and must give way to the 
(nearly) incalculable effect of gaslighting. In this way, what is at stake is not only this 
“allegory of sprit,” but also the means for allegory as a category of appropriation 
whereby the shifty lines of recognition dislocate the projection of gas21. But since this 
“allegory of sprit” as the revised history of a reading does include the two parentheti-
cal questions, then the means for further questions must have been inserted all along 
into a context that has never been completely covered by its allegorical stance since it 
exceeded the limits of its outset and efficiency according to a range that could no 
more be defined by this “allegory of sprit” than the social, and also allegorical, infra-
structure of that to which that context was explicitly related to. (However, one should 
not disregard the possibility that this new wave of questions (“Who does Paula know 
to be in the attic? And before all: Who did she know was there before she knew? And 
who am I to want to know what Paula knows”) has been exposed to the possibility of 
addressing what in every film inscribes a priori the possibility of further questions 
that, even without programmed directions, ought to remain effective as cases of, and 
for, “a moving image of skepticism.”) 
The attic as the secret space for a “spectral” marriage, one that no longer 
speaks (much), or which, instead of speaking, only allows for the chatter against 
which Elizabeth’s explanation can be heard, works as a sort of block, however much it 
is intended to maintain this marriage’s history as an allegory, and contains its spec-
tratorship since it itself is (re)constructed out of disintegration (at least before the 
film as both an allegory for history and the deferral of its philosophical-historical 
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inverted take on Jacques Lacan’s somewhat hilarious formula, il n’y a pas de rapport sexuel, and Alain 
Badiou and Barbara Cassin’s programmatically consensual approach. See Jean-Luc Nancy. L’ “il y a” 
du rapport sexuel (Paris: Galilée, 2001); and Alain Badiou and Barbara Cassin, Il n’y a pas de rapport 
sexuel: Deux leçons sur «L’Étourdit» de Lacan (Paris: Fayard, 2010); and Jacques Lacan, “L’Étourdit” 
[1973], in Autres écrits (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2001), 449-495. (In a further turn of the screw, all 
these aspects would need to be reconsidered alongside some scattered considerations from Fredric 
Jameson and Jean-Luc Nancy regarding the endless issue of pornography.) For Jean Domarchi, “[s]i 
Cukor s’intéresse tant à la femme, c’est parce qu’elle est le problème numéro 1 de l’Amérique (aussi 
important, en tout cas, que celui de la ségrégation).” See Domarchi. George Cukor (Seghers: Paris, 
1965), 57. 
21. A point to be reconfigured according to Cavell’s remarks on Freud and Heidegger in rela-
tion to the translation of The World Viewed into French under the title La Projection du monde. See 
Cavell, La projection du monde: Réflexions sur l’ontologie du cinéma, trans. Christian Fournier (Paris, 
Belin, 1999); “Conclusion”, ed. Sandra Laugier and Marc Cerisuelo, Stanley Cavell: Cinéma et philo-
sophie (Paris: Presses de Sorbonne Nouvelle, 2001), 294. 
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definition). The parenthetical questions destined to set a limit to it pass alongside 
Gaslight, but only in such a way that, while available for history as an allegory set up 
within a domestically limited sphere of affects, they also comprise a (nearly) uncon-
trollable net of “connections” whose complexity doesn't allow for the final 
(re)cognition of the motives or grounds for Gregory’s actions. The attic would then be 
another counter-crypt for this “allegory of sprit” as an allegory of history, since the 
crypt contains a counter-crypt — or since Kant stands before cinema as both its pos-
sibility and (privileged?) spectrator — and vice-versa (or: the crypt can only stand be-
fore its counter-crypt; after all, if something remains to be seen in-between the ques-
tions, it follows that the possibility of history proceeds from the counter-crypt as it 
works out, as well as through, this re-reading of Gaslight without turning it into a fu-
neral urn, and while thankfully still offering a condition for both philosophy and cin-
ema without a (final) answer.) 
 
 
5. And then no closure before two parenthetical questions... 
 
But the dimension Elizabeth’s explanation invokes of gas coming in pipes, and 
of having more or less gas put into the pipes, and not ones joining merely the 
rooms within this house, but one's linking this house with numberless other 
houses, is the dimension of a social organism in which this house functions, 
bound in the networks of dependence of a vast city. Hence the dimension is an 
allegory of those features of (modern) life that Gregory can depend upon, 
without planning, that support the deference and secrecy his plans require — 
the obedience of servants; the nightly visits to a “studio” where he does myste-
rious, unshareable work; power to exclude all other people and all other places 
from his marital privacy. I do not have to say that his occupations are, allegori-
cally, characteristic of the society that supports them to observe that his evil is, 
for all its exotic trappings, utterly, unutterably, unoriginal — like the preoccu-
pations of melodrama.22 
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22. Cavell, Contesting Tears, 75-76. 
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As a historically allegorical explanation provided by Elizabeth (Barbara Everest), “the 
dimension of gas coming in pipes” implies itself as part of a “social organism” in or-
der to bring about the rotation of historical life as a social cycle. Gregory's tricks as 
acts of unoriginality thus induce a certain impression of theatricality: not because 
they are performed only as a restaging of what has passed into history, but rather be-
cause they act upon its condition in order to turn it into what has passed for history. 
This “vampirism” re-enters as alteration so that it draws its work under its spell and 
the allegory articulated in Gaslight therefore includes its own, and necessarily im-
proper, recitation, particularly because once the (apparent) end of the film is 
reached, so is the condition of its spectral predictability as the end of a (still) rational, 
consistent, and sequential (ghost) story of history.23 
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23. A longer version of this text is part of a work-in-progress titled Essays on Re-applied 
Catallegory Fatigue, and takes its place alongside the following issues: cinephilia’s precariousness as a 
form of cinephagia and addiction; the place of Plato’s The Republic and Aristotle’s Politics in film the-
ory; Gilles Deleuze and the issue of “science-fiction” regarding some films from  Danièle Huillet and 
Jean-Marie Straub, and Jean-Luc Godard; Fredric Jameson’s politico-cinematographic allegories; 
Manny Farber’s considerations on cinematographic space. See Amorim, “Catallegory fatigue re-
entries before an introductory negative space, or, Here and there space remains the place for cinema”. 
Comparat/ive Cinema 4, “Manny Farber: Systems of Movement,” (July 2014). 
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Romantic Affinities?: Cavell on Opera, Film, 
and the Claim of Expression 







In “Opera and the Lease of Voice,” a chapter of A Pitch of Philosophy (1994),1 as in a 
relatively recent essay entitled “Opera in (and as) Film” (2005),2 Cavell develops a 
compelling argument about the link between these two art forms. According to him, 
opera and film represent two historically distant attempts to come to terms with the 
same “cultural trauma,” one he characterizes as “having to do with a crisis of expres-
sion, a sense that language as such, reason as such, can no longer be assured of its rela-
tion to a world apart from me or to the reality of the passions within me.”3 Such a crisis 
has a name: it is called skepticism. 
It comes as no surprise to those familiar with Cavell’s work, namely with The 
Claim of Reason (1979), and his books on cinema — The World Viewed (1971), Pur-
suits of Happiness (1981), Contesting Tears (1996), and Cities of Words (2005) — that 
skepticism and the manifold efforts to overcome it are among the major Leitmotive of 
Cavell’s thought.4 Likewise, it is well known fact that for him Shakespeare’s (tragic) 
theatre and Descartes’s (solipsistic) philosophy were crucial manifestations of — and, 
concomitantly, attempts to appease — the increasingly generalized anxiety, which came 
of age around the transition between the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, 
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1. Cavell, “Opera and the Lease of Voice,” in A Pitch of Philosophy: Autobiographical Exer-
cises (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 129-169. 
2. Cavell, “Opera in (and as) Film,” in William Rothman (ed.), Cavell on Film (New York: State 
University of New York Press, 2005), 305-318. 
3. Cavell, “Opera in (and as) Film,” 306. 
4. It is the ambition of art (especially of theatre and cinema) and philosophy, from Shake-
speare’s later oeuvre to Hollywood’s comedies and melodramas of the thirties and forties, passing 
through the writings of Emerson and Thoreau, to overcome such a crisis. The opposition to skepticism 
is actually what brings art and philosophy together, inasmuch as they both suffer from, and try to rem-
edy, the oppressing feeling of incommunicability. 
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about the actual powers of language and reason to express the intricacies of human ex-
perience and to uncover the complexities of the world around. The same applies to op-
era, which Cavell insists should be understood as both a symptom and an attempt (his-
torically coincident with that of Shakespeare’s later comedies, The Winter’s Tale and 
The Tempest in particular) to appease the malady of skepticism. In Cavell’s own words, 
from the “Overture” of A Pitch of Philosophy:  
 
[O]pera’s issues can be seen to be a response to, hence a continual illumination 
of, the divisions of self, the suffocation of speech, and the withdrawal of the 
world that have preoccupied philosophy since the advent of skepticism in Des-
cartes, which is to say, explicitly since the generation after the invention of opera 
and the construction of the works of Shakespeare.5 
 
Alongside philosophy, opera and film have thus at least this point in common: they 
both respond to that “traumatic crisis of expression,”6 which Cavell explicitly construes 
as a “historical break in Western history in which conditions of a catastrophe of human 
understanding came together, in which, for example, language as such comes to seem 
incapable of representing the world.”7 So viewed, the link between opera and film ap-
pears to be intrinsically historical — though incapable of being explained in historicist 
terms (i.e., by tracing lines of causality between socially and historically defined cul-
tural facts). Their affinity instead lies, to follow Cavell, not in the circumstance that 
they share a set of unhistorical qualities as multimedia art forms, but in the fact that 
they are as it were subterraneously bound to each other as symptomatic responses to 
the same historical drama: the advent of skepticism that marks the dawn of western 
modernity, with consequences spanning the centuries to follow. 
Yet film provides not only a later, but also a qualitatively different, “happier, 
anyway less fatal”8 response, by virtue of which cinema may be seen as both an inheri-
tor and a competitor of opera. Cavell’s reading of the scene of Frank Capra’s Mr. Deeds 
goes to town (1936), in which the protagonist shows himself unwilling to support opera 
financially — as his recently deceased uncle used to do — offers a condensed version of 
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5. Cavell, A Pitch of Philosophy, viii. 
6. Cavell, “Opera in (and as) Film,” 306. 
7. Cavell, “Opera and the Lease of Voice,” 139 (my emphasis). 
8. Ibid., 135. 
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his argument regarding the agonistic affinity between the two genres. In this scene, 
Frank Capra would confess “film’s sense of affinity with opera, often expressed in an 
impulse of competition with opera.”9 Opera, Mr. Deeds seems eager to claim, is admit-
tedly a wrong show to put on. But the reason for this view, with the correlative intima-
tion that film in turn is the right show to put on, is less financially driven, according to 
Cavell, than one is inclined to think at first sight. At issue in this scene is arguably not 
“that movies are in some obvious sense economically more viable than operas,”10 but 
that Capra allegorizes film’s own “claims to inherit from opera the flame that preserves 
the human need, on pain of madness of melancholy, for conviction in its expressions of 
passion.”11  
Regardless of the viewpoint taken, it seems indisputable that the way in which 
Cavell understands the relationship between opera and cinema could not be without 
consequences to the understanding of their historical unfolding as art forms. In other 
words, not only is their link historical (in the above-explained sense), but the disclosure 
of it also prompts a certain understanding of both opera and film that is charged with 
historically meaningful consequences. In this essay, though I will not remain silent 
about Cavell’s thoughts on opera, I will mainly focus on film.  
To render my purpose as clearly as possible, I permit myself to draw attention to 
a passage in “Opera and the Lease of Voice,” in which Cavell anticipates the reader’s 
perplexity and asks: “Why go to film to raise the question of opera? Why not to opera 
directly?” The reader of this article is much more likely to ask the same question in its 
inverted sense: Why go to — Cavell’s view of — opera to raise the question of — and 
discuss Cavell’s thoughts on — film? I can answer this question by adding to Cavell’s 
response that if “what happened to opera as an institution is that it transformed itself 
into film, that film is, or was, our opera,”12 as Cavell compellingly claims, then an in-
quiry is worth pursuing into film’s claim of expression that seriously takes into account 
that music is what in opera embodies “the flame that preserves the human need […] for 
conviction in its expressions of passion.”13 How did film transform, while appropriat-
ing, such ethereal flame?  
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My purpose in this piece, without losing sight of the previous question, is then 
less to further clarify how Cavell understands cinema in its generality — which is one 
of the most debated topics in Cavellian scholarship — than to ask how Cavell’s insight 
into the agonistic affinity between opera and film may be brought to bear on a 
broader debate on film’s operatic inheritance in relation to the use of music – be it 
operatic or not — in cinema. This will lead me to a brief appraisal of Terrence Ma-
lick’s recent work (especially The Tree of Life (2011) and To the Wonder (2012)), in 






As for opera, Cavell is clear enough regarding the relevance of music as the means 
through which an overcoming of skepticism, however precarious it might have been, 
took place: “Nothing less than such a trauma [that of skepticism] could meet the sense 
of language as requiring as it were a rescue by music.”14 At the dawn of the seventeenth 
century, music alone would have been able to reassure the modern subject of her or his 
ability to convey the intricacies of inner passion or pain. In opera, the human being en-
dowed with language would have regained so to say a voice — one that, while taking 
hold of her or him, is, and is not, her or his own voice (as if vulnerability to the alienat-
ing power of music were the price to pay for the rescue of human communication from 
the narrow scope of ordinary language).  
Historically seen, Cavell’s take on the birth of opera — one that stresses its rele-
vance as an artistic phenomenon that, similarly to film, could not have taken place in 
any other period of history — seems to be confirmed by the otherwise anodyne fact that 
the myth of Orpheus haunted the history of opera from its very beginning.  
That Monteverdi’s first opera, as well as the two that preceded his initiating 
masterpiece, and Gluck’s masterpiece a century later, which brings the aria to the mu-
sical level of the recitative (a point I accept from Joseph Kerman), all work from the 
myth of Orpheus and Eurydice is almost too good to be true in establishing the myth of 
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opera, of its origins — the story of the power of music, epitomized as the act of sing-
ing.15 
Cavell thus reads the myth as a parable of skepticism. When Orpheus looks back 
at Eurydice — to reassure himself of her presence — that is precisely when he loses her 
for good. In the myth, music finds itself at the heart of such parable, in which it plays a 
redemptive role. Nothing can bring Eurydice back, and the feeling of her loss cannot be 
expressed by words alone. It demands the help of music. In fact, in opera, the rescue of 
language by music is inextricably linked to the singing voice. Although Eurydice is ir-
remissibly gone, it is as if her spirit survived — so to speak as music — in the moving 
songs conceived by Orpheus’s wounded genius. 
But how about film? Where are we to find the antidote against skepticism in the 
case of the art of moving pictures? What exactly, in cinema, plays the role that music 
does in opera? What is — put another way — the counterpart of operatic music in film, 
thanks to which it managed to find a path out of the prison of linguistic/existential fini-
tude? As I previously underlined, my aim is not to elaborate on Cavell’s view of film, 
but rather to discuss the consequences of his insight on the affinity between opera and 
cinema for questioning the importance of expression in film. So, admitting with Cavell 
that opera, thanks to the transfigurative power of music, allowed for an overcoming, 
however precarious it might have been, of skepticism, what does, in that case, play the 
role — the expressive, anti-skeptic, romantic role — of music in cinema? One might an-
swer this question in a variety of ways. At least three: by means of an analogy, of a 
metaphor, or else literally. 
The first answer consists in stressing that the expressive qualities of moving im-
ages are somehow parallel — analogous — to the aural expressiveness of music. This 
answer decisively emphasizes the visual nature of cinema, the sense that cinema has 
essentially to do with the power of image. However counterintuitive the equation be-
tween the expressiveness of moving images and moving sounds might seem today, the 
truth is that it lends plausibility to the fact that cinema showed itself fascinated by op-
era right from the beginning (since the period of silent cinema). Cavell acknowledges 
precisely this early sense of affinity when he recalls that “[e]ven in the silent era of film, 
Cecil B. DeMille made a film of Carmen as an opera, as if to declare that the expressive 
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powers of silent film are equal to those of music”;16 or when he points out, as he retro-
spectively accounts for his interest in the link between opera and film, that “the con-
nection I would go to draw between film and opera was to analogize the camera’s pow-
ers of transfiguration to those of music, each providing settings of words and persons 
that unpredictably take them into a new medium with laws of its own.”17 
The second possible answer — in which one is to resort to a metaphor — is in no 
way less Cavellian. If anything, it is at the closest to the singularity of his work on film, 
with its recognizable emphasis on Hollywood’s golden age, especially on a set of movies 
from the 1930s and 1940s, which Cavell tries to interpret in their specificity by claiming 
that they form two interrelated genres: the “comedy of remarriage” (see The Pursuit of 
Happiness) and the “melodrama of the unknown woman” (see Contesting Tears). In 
both these genres (or sub-genres), the female character is the trigger for action, and the 
key to grasp what is at stake in the film. In Cavell’s words: 
 
I have been working out the thought that film — judging from the genres of 
comedy and of the melodrama whose affinities I have traced elsewhere — is, or 
was, about the creation of the woman, about her demand for an education, for a 
voice in her history. In the comedies this happens by way of something there 
represented as the possibility of marriage; in the melodramas it happens in the 
rejection of what in them is pictured as the option of marriage.18 
 
In both cases, what interests Cavell the most — and matters to us here — is, as he puts 
it in the Introduction to Contesting Tears, “the creation of the woman — the new crea-
tion of the woman, the creation of the new woman, the new creation of the human.”19 
As if women were, metaphorically put, the privileged protagonists of an universal over-
coming of skepticism through film, thus playing the same role as music in opera. Al-
ready in opera, women were significantly assigned a crucial – if tragically mortal — 
role. As Cavell maintains in the wake of Catherine Clément (whose book L’Opéra ou la 
défaite des femmes was translated into English as Opera, or the Undoing of Women), 
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they eventually die, so to speak, “because they sing,”20 because men hear in their voice 
“what they want and want not to hear”21 — a situation that Cavell deems parallel to the 
“self-torment whose shape is skepticism, in which the philosopher wants and wants not 
to exempt himself from the closet of privacy, wants and wants not to become intelligi-
ble, expressive, exposed.”22 
The difference between opera and cinema, as regards the role of the feminine, 
thus consists in the fact that whereas in opera the flight from the ordinary is without 
return to the female character, thus prompting the diva to die of her own singing, in 
film her reinvention — with a more or less happy outcome — succeeds in breaking the 
chains of inexpressiveness, in aptly transcending the narrow confines of human com-
munication. 
The third answer to the question as to where, in film, the source of expression 
lies (admitting that it lies in music in the case of opera) reads like a tautology. In fact, 
one could answer that question as simply as to claim that the “equivalent” of operatic 
music in film is nothing else than the music composed, adapted, rearranged for, or 
simply used (quoted) in, film. In fact, without ever being an isolated element, music is 
arguably one of the chief means at hand of filmmakers to enhance the expressive power 
of cinema. 
The ways in which music is used in cinema, notably for expressive reasons, have 
been receiving a great deal of attention in recent years. In addition, it should be men-
tioned that long before the appearance of film music studies, Adorno and Eisler jointly 
wrote a pioneering book, Composing for the Films (1947), which provides a back-
ground for later discussion and raises questions that would be later developed in vari-
ous directions.23 I will not go into details about the many aspects of this debate, but 
note that a recurrent trope in the field consists in isolating Wagner as a key figure to 
think the interrelation of opera and film through the lens of the use of music in cinema. 
Scores like those of Star Wars or The Lord of the Rings are often referred to as 
Wagnerian on account of the sense grandiose, epic, overwhelming feeling they instill in 
the viewer/listener. But is this the best interpretation of Adorno’s remark that to think 
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of the relationship between opera (especially Wagner’s) and film amounts to postulate 
the “birth of film out of the spirit of music”24? As far as I am concerned, I think that the 
recognition of the name of “Wagner” on the sole ground of style (as a synonym of Teu-
tonic grandiosity in music) is not only simplistic but also potentially misleading. I’ll re-
turn to this theme later. 
So we have three answers, three ways of grasping, as it were, the essence of the 
expressive power of cinema: by drawing attention (1) to the homology between the ex-
pressive powers of moving image and music, (2) to the embodiment of the claim of ex-
pression in women’s willingness to change their lives and find their own existential 
path, (3) to the acknowledgement of music’s expressive function in film (similarly to 
opera). Despite their differences, these answers do not exclude each other. Cavell him-
self gives an example of their coming together when he characterizes women’s existen-
tial journey in comedies and melodramas as one having to do with both a change in 
their appearance as well as with an upheaval in their lives. In this case the analogy that 
equates the expressive powers of moving images with those of music is what lends visi-
bility to the metaphor according to which the woman succeeds in overcoming the cir-
cumstances that condemn her to inexpressiveness, insofar as her education and self-
discovery coincide with her reshaping her own image.  
By the same token, Cavell’s pronouncements on the use of music in films are 
rare, at least compared with his analyses of how many movies allude to opera in 
general, or (quite often and in the most pregnant instances) to one opera in particu-
lar. In fact, these later references are not only important to interpret the film as 
such, but seem to provide an invaluable clue to ponder the subterraneous competi-
tion between film and opera. This is what happens in Moonstruck (1989) and Meet-
ing Venus (1991), which Cavell discusses in “Opera in (and as) film” with an eye on 
their respective references to Puccini’s La Bohème and Wagner’s Tannhäuser. Ac-
cording to Cavell, they are paradigmatic of “the category in which a particular opera 
enters into the substance of a film, where the competition between an opera and the 
attention given to it in the film becomes an essential part of the film’s subject; or to 
say it otherwise, where to understand the relation between the film and the opera to 
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which it weds itself sets the primary task of the understanding of the film.”25 Be that 
as it may, the fact remains that the legacy of opera has also made its way into cin-





In keeping with the previous reflections, and to bring this conversation a bit further, it 
is perhaps timely to turn to Terrence Malick. As the reader is likely to know, Malick 
graduated in philosophy at Harvard, having been close to Cavell since the sixties as 
both a student and a friend. Besides this, he apparently faced the dilemma of choosing 
between the career of a filmmaker and that of a philosopher (he even published a 
translation of, along with a comment to, Heidegger’s The Essence of Reason [Das We-
sens des Grundes] before starting his studies on cinema more seriously).26 This said, if 
I bring Malick into discussion here, it is less due to the affinities between him and Cav-
ell that the above-mentioned facts suggest, than because his use of music (mainly of 
romantic music) in his two most recent films (The Tree of Life, and To the Wonder) 
seems to embody — perhaps, I reckon, too literally — the claim of expression that Cav-
ell describes in his writings on film.  
Thus, if one wonders how the use of music (notably of pre-existing music) may 
contribute to the strengthening of the expressive power of cinema, and if one is in 
search of examples, one may easily become persuaded that the quotations of a huge 
amount of compositions in Malick’s recent films (by J. S. Bach, Haydn, Berlioz, 
Dvorak, Mussorgsky, Wagner, Tchaikovsky, Mahler, Respighi, Gorecki, Shostakovitch, 
Rachmaninov, Lupicka, Part, Rataavara, among others) corresponds to a possible ac-
tualization of Cavell’s ideas. In these films (as already in The Thin Red Line and The 
New World), music seems to be at the service of the exteriorization of a certain Stim-
mung, one that Malick finds better captured — if one looks back to the previous list of 
names — in Romantic music... Like the voice-off — through which the inner thoughts 
of the characters become audible — music seems to play an incantatory role in a perfect 
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match with breathtaking images of nature and people (running, dancing, fighting, play-
ing…) against the background of natural, rural or urban scenery. Put otherwise, in 
many of Malick’s films, music enhances the expressive power of images in a quite con-
spicuous way.  
This said, the truth is also that the more music contributes to the expressiveness 
of the film, the more the “intrusive” power of music comes to light — that is, the more it 
becomes apparent that the expressive and the manipulative aspects of music may even-
tually overlap. There is a scene in The Tree of Life in which Smetana’s The Moldau is 
heard for about three minutes. The use of this piece is anything but arbitrary. In fact, 
the musical depiction of the course of the river — sometimes serene, other times turbu-
lent — seems to offer a parable of the course of life, driven — as the film itself intimates 
— by the conflicting forces of “nature” and “grace.” The symbiosis of image and sound, 
for the sake of expressiveness, finds in this scene a paradigmatic example. By the same 
token, all this seems to be at the service of a certain worldview. Incidentally, one that 
not only hangs on the dichotomy between nature and grace, but that also suggests that 
redemption lies in choosing the path of grace, of acceptance, of spirituality. 
These remarks lead me to one last hypothesis: that what Wagner is blamed for 
— a certain totalization of artistic means, aimed at producing an overwhelming impact 
over the spectator that will ultimately get him/her to adhere to a certain worldview — is 
not without similarities with what Malick tries to achieve in using music the way he 
does in these films. This hypothesis prompts a lot of questions, not the least of which is 
whether Wagner’s Gesammtkunstwerk actually represents a totalizing, authoritarian, 
or proto-fascist (as Lacoue-Labarthe suggested)27 moment in the history of opera. A 
case can be made that in Wagner’s work the heterogeneous, the unsubsumable, and the 
undecidable play a much more crucial role (as Badiou claimed)28 than is often admit-
ted. Nevertheless, it seems clear that the strengthening of the expressive power of one 
art — leading, in the limit, to the attempt to convey the complexity of human experi-
ence as such — tends to go hand in hand with the attempt to articulate as closely as 
possible its different components (the aural, the visual, the linguistic, and so forth).  
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It is precisely this insight that might make us further investigate the political 
stakes and consequences of assuming that expression – thanks to which art would take 
hold of the spectator, the viewer, the listener — is what art is all about. Cavell, to be to-
tally fair, insists less on the normative weight of such a claim of expression than on its 
usefulness as a descriptive tool (in the face of the unfolding of the arts and particularly 
the affinity between opera and cinema). As for Malick, one might probably say that he 
often appears to be more Cavellian than Cavell himself. In fact, a certain quest for ex-
pressiveness seems to have dictated the most intimate law of his films. 
In the meantime, drawing on Cavell’s emphasis on the expressive core of the 
arts, we are left with an unattended parallel between Wagner and Malick, with what I 
suggest could be seen as a romantic affinity: the will to bring to the limit the expressive 
power of a medium in order to endow that medium with the capacity to give visual, 
aural, intelligible shape to both the inner and outer sides of human experience. In this 
regard, rather than taking sides or providing answers, I allow myself to include me 
among those who are still in doubt, still in search of a better understanding of the 
promises and deeds of music in both opera and cinema, still willing to bring further the 
conversation about the joys, the challenges, and the ruses of artistic expression. 
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One curious aspect of Stanley Cavell’s investigations into skepticism is his relative 
neglect of one of philosophy’s most important skeptics, David Hume. Cavell’s think-
ing about skepticism is located in relation to Wittgenstein, Kant, Emerson, Austin, 
and others.  But while Hume is occasionally mentioned, those encounters are brief 
and generally dismissive. In “Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy,” for exam-
ple, Cavell remarks that while “Hume is always a respectable place to begin,”1 Kant is 
“deeper and obscurer” (MWM, 88). The important Cavell scholar Timothy Gould fol-
lows Cavell in this, writing that: “Hume’s tactic of playing billiards as a relief from the 
melancholy of reflection and skepticism is a relatively unsophisticated strategy, com-
pared to some that I know of.”2   
Except, perhaps, for the idea that Kant is more obscure, I think this assess-
ment of Hume to be a mistake on Cavell et al.’s part, as I think there are important 
and helpful resources to be culled from le bon David for those of us working through 
the constellation of topics Cavell has done so much to clarify and to confront. Cavell’s, 
like Gould’s, discounting Hume so quickly, and in my view thoughtlessly, is, I sus-
pect, a casualty of the twentieth century’s dominant readings of Hume either as a 
kind of proto-positivist, as a psychologizing naturalist, more recently as a realist, or, 
as we will see later, a “paltry” empiricist. In this essay, in conjunction with another I 
have produced, I hope to go some distance towards both remedying the neglect of 
Hume in Cavell studies and correcting those misleading readings of Hume.3 In par-
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ticular, I wish here to compare and contrast Hume and Cavell along two axes central 
to each of their thoughts about skepticism: (1) the naturalness (and unnaturalness) of 
skeptical doubt and (2) the recovery or attainment of the ordinary in the wake of 
skeptical doubt. One might regard these as, respectively, moments of loss and return. 
Let’s begin with the loss, the naturalness of loss, one might say the loss of naturalism. 
1. Skeptical Doubt as Natural. One of the dimensions of human life that Hume 
finds impresses itself on us in unbidden ways is skepticism. Michael Williams has ar-
gued that in the context of ordinary language skeptical doubts are “unnatural” and 
not compelling, without a means of getting off the ground, or as Cavell might put it, 
without a way to respond to a “reasonable” question.4 But both Cavell and Hume — in 
what I think is a crucial similarity between them and one that aligns them against 
many of the critiques of skepticism that interpret it as mere confusion — regard the 
rise of skeptical doubts, as in a fashion, natural. Hume writes that “sceptical doubt 
arises naturally”5 and that it, “both with respect to reason and the senses, is a malady, 
which can never be radically cur’d” (T 1.4.2.57, SBN 218).  
Now, indeed, those doubts arise, for Hume, only in the solitary context of 
“profound and intense reflection” (T 1.4.2.57, SBN 218), a context different, as 
Timothy Gould breezily observes, from the region of life where Hume says, “I dine, I 
play a game of back-gammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends; and when 
after three of four hour’s amusement I would return to these speculations, they ap-
pear so cold, and strain’d and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into 
them any farther” (T 1.4.7.9, SBN 269) — an account, I think, fairly described as 
portraying the meaningless and not-compelling quality (if not exactly unintelligibil-
ity) of skeptical inquiry. Hume similarly also renders the scene of skeptical inquiry 
as of a different “sphere,” other to what he terms “common life” (T 1.4.7.13, SBN 
271).  
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Hume, of course, declares that in opposition to extreme forms of skeptical 
doubt: “I find myself absolutely and necessarily determin’d to live, and talk, and act 
like other people” (T 1.4.7.10, SBN 269) in the contexts of common life. Though in a 
sense skeptical doubt is a malady that cannot be cured, Hume calls upon the tradi-
tionally therapeutic effects of “nature,” which “suffices to that purpose [i.e., of dispel-
ling doubt], and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium” (T 1.4.7.9, 
SBN 269). It is just this sense of nature as a therapeutic defeater of skeptical doubt, in 
the face of which skepticism is in Strawson’s characterization “powerless” and unin-
telligible, that has led so many important interpreters to read Hume as anti-skeptical 
and a realist.6 
But there is a countervailing demand of nature, not so commonly quoted, that 
Hume identifies in fact as the “origin” of his philosophy (T 1.4.7.12, SBN 271) — and, 
not irrelevantly, of his skeptical doubt. Hume writes that:  
 
At the time, therefore that I am tir’d with amusement and company, and have 
indulg’d a reverie in my chamber or a solitary walk by a river-side, I feel my 
mind all collected within itself, and am naturally inclin’d to carry my view into 
all those subjects, about which I met with so many disputes in the course of my 
reading and conversation […]. These sentiments spring up naturally in my pre-
sent disposition […]. (T 1.4.7.12, SBN 270-71)  
 
There is something, according to Hume, natural in the sense of being necessary as 
well as unbidden about this sort of reflection for him: “even suppose […] curiosity 
and ambition shou’d not transport me into speculations without the sphere of com-
mon life, it wou’d necessarily happen…”, since “’tis almost impossible for the mind of 
man to rest, like those of beasts, in that narrow circle of objects which are the subject 
of daily conversation and action” (T 1.4.7.13, SBN 271). Moreover, as the trajectory of 
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Book 1 of the Treatise testifies and in what David Macarthur calls “Hume’s insight,” 
naturalistic epistemological investigations themselves lead to skepticism.7 
Hume appreciates, as Cavell does, that there is nothing more human than the 
refusal or the wish to transcend or the impulse to speculate beyond the diurnal, the 
everyday, the ordinary and common; and indeed it stands prominently among Cav-
ell’s criticisms of recent philosophical critiques of skepticism that, unlike those of 
early modern philosophers, they do not take the naturalness of skepticism seriously. 
Cavell affirms the naturalness of the loss he wishes to redress, the denial he wishes to 
confront, the reasonableness of skeptical questions about our best cases, and the feel-
ing of a kind separateness or alienation from others and the world:  
 
But when the experience created by such thought is there, it is something that 
presents itself to me as one, as I have wished to express it, of being sealed off 
from the world, enclosed within my own endless succession of experiences. It 
is an experience for which there must be a psychological explanation; but no 
such explanation would or should prove its epistemological insignificance. And 
I know of no philosophical criticism which proves it either. (CR 144) 
 
The moral [i.e. that “I can never know”] is a natural, inevitable extension of the 
conclusion drawn [i.e. that “in this best case I don’t know”] […]. The step from 
the conclusion about this object to the moral about knowledge as a whole is ir-
resistible. It is no step at all. The world drops out. […] What “best case” turns 
out to mean can be expressed in a major premiss: If I know anything, I know 
this. (CR 145-46) 
 
The irresistible extension of skepticism has produced a sense of being sealed off and 
of being able only to look at the world from the outside (an idea implicit in philoso-
phers sceptically speaking about an “external” world) that has “become […] natural” 
to us. Cavell finds the modern mind exploring it in film, as if we have come to view 
the world on a cinematic screen in the perceptual theaters of our minds: “Our condi-
tion has become one in which our natural mode of perception is to view, feeling un-
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7. David Macarthur, “Naturalism and Skepticism,” in Mario De Caro and David Macarthur 
(eds.), Naturalism in Question (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2004), 108. 
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seen. We do no so much look at the world as look out at it, from behind the self.”8 
Hume affirms just this sort of way of conceiving perception, if not exactly the self, 
when he writes, “The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions succes-
sively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite va-
riety of postures and situations” (T 1.4.6.4, SBN 252-53). 
Cavell does, however, qualify the naturalness of this sense of loss and distance 
to the world by writing about the basis for skeptical conclusions (e.g., that “we do not 
know the existence of objects”), if it makes sense to speak strictly about skeptical con-
clusions,9 that: 
 
I want to show several things: that it [i.e. the basis of skeptical conclusions] is 
not fully natural, and that it is not fully unnatural […]. 
 
It is not the philosopher’s choice to produce this basis. Given his context and 
object and his question reasonably asked, the basis is as determined by ordi-
nary language as the kind of basis we can offer about an Austinian object is. 
So the basis is not absurd. But it is not fully natural either […]. (CR 161) 
 
The naturalness, and thence unchosen quality, of partially unnatural skeptical inquir-
ies is rooted for Cavell, it turns out, in the ordinary itself. That skeptical conclusions 
emerge naturally from the ordinary is, indeed, one reason why Cavell finds the “ac-
tual” everyday (älltaglichen, Umgangssprache), and not (only) skeptical philosophy, 
to be as “pervasive a scene of illusion and trance and artificiality (of need) as Plato or 
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8. Cavell,  The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film, enlarged edn. (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1980; original edition 1971), 102. Cavell carries on in this passage discussing 
the depths to which cinema exhibits our skeptical despair (anticipating his 1981 Pursuits of 
Happiness): “It is our fantasies, now all but completely thwarted and out of hand, which are unseen 
and must be kept unseen. As if we could no longer hope that anyone might share them — at just the 
moment that they are pouring into the streets, less private than ever. So we are less than ever in a 
position to marry them to the world.” 
9. Of course, Cavell’s example here, as well as others in the CR are only in qualified ways 
properly understood as skeptical propositions, since skepticism, understood in both the Pyrrhonian 
and Academic traditions, does not advance truth-claims, even negative truth claims. Without 
qualification, these conclusions are not skeptical but negative dogmatic assertions, or perhaps 
argumentative gambits meant to balance against contrary dogmatic claims (e.g., that “we do know the 
existence of objects”). That there may be possible modes of assertion consistent with skepticism (forms 
of assent, approval, yielding, living according to appearance, etc.) is a controversy Cavell elides here. 
And so we might understand his analysis to be limited to a specific understanding of skepticism — e.g. 
skepticism of the sort expressed in Descartes’s “Meditation I.” 
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Rousseau or Marx or Thoreau had found.”10 While for Hume skepticism results from 
a careful philosophical scrutiny of the general bases of human knowledge claims (i.e., 
reason and the senses), for Cavell the very conditions of the possibility of meaningful 
language — crucially, ordinary language as well as philosophical knowledge claims — 
bear within them skeptical potential such that they are also simultaneously and nec-
essarily conditions for the possibility of the emergence of skeptical doubt. For Cavell 
this means that skepticism is not the product of a specific language game (call it the 
philosophers’ or epistemologists’ language game) but of language überhaupt, of hu-
manness itself.  
Those conditions for the possibility of meaningful human life generally that 
are also the source of the skeptical malady’s incurable persistence are “criteria” per 
se. As Wittgenstein shows, meaningful human life depends upon shared criteria for 
talking, writing, thinking, and acting; but in Cavell’s assessment, it is of the nature of 
criteria themselves to open the possibility of skeptical doubt. The most general crite-
ria of human life by their very nature as criteria open “gaps” or yield to the opening of 
gaps between world, word, self, and others from which skeptical doubts emerge. This 
is so even for the criteria that no recognizably human being could “fail to know” 
(MWM, 96), that underwrite what Wittgenstein calls the “grammatical sentences” 
framing the essence of humanness and the essences of things in the human world, the 
criteria that make possible what have come to be called Wittgenstein’s not-
meaningfully-doubtable “hinge” propositions.11 Cavell writes that: 
 
the skeptic’s denial of our criteria is a denial to which criteria must be open. If 
the fact that we share, or have established, criteria is the condition under 
which we can think and communicate in language, then skepticism is a natu-
ral possibility of that condition, it reveals most perfectly the standing threat to 
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10. Cavell, This New Yet Unapproachable America: Lectures after Emerson after 
Wittgenstein (Albuquerque: Living Batch Press, 1989), 46. Hereafter, “NYUA.” 
11. On “hinge” propositions see Wittgenstein’s On Certainty: “the questions that we raise and 
our doubts depend upon the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like 
hinges on which those turn. […] That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations 
that certain things are in deed not doubted. But it isn’t that the situation is like this: We just can’t 
investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the 
door to turn, the hinges must stay put”; Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, edited and translated by 
G. E. M. Anscombe & G. H. von Wright (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1972), §§341-43, hereafter 
“OC.” Curiously, Cavell says he had not read, had not forced himself to read, On Certainty by the time 
The Claim of Reason was written. 
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thought and communication, that they are only human, nothing more than 
natural to us.12 One misses the drive of Wittgenstein if one is not […] suffi-
ciently open to the threat of skepticism (i.e., to the skeptic in oneself); or if one 
takes Wittgenstein […] to deny the truth of skepticism. (CR 47)  
 
Shared criteria make it possible for humans to agree. But criteria are necessarily 
“open” in the sense that the application or projection of criteria in new contexts in 
ways that sustain agreement is an ongoing affair for which we must assume responsi-
bility, which cannot be justified by anything beyond ourselves, and which may always 
and already (I wish to say) stand vulnerable and open to disruption or misalign-
ment.13  
I may not follow you in future applications of words and in future deeds. You 
may not follow me. Our judgments may fall out of attunement, our lives may fall out 
of sync, and we may find ourselves at a loss in how to talk and act in the world. 
Hume’s rowers may no longer find themselves able to row together (T 3.2.2.10, SBN 
315). Instead of holding another's hand, I may find I can go no further and can do no 
better than to “turn my palms outward, as if to exhibit the kind of creature I am, and 
declare my ground occupied, only mine, ceding yours” (CR 115). In any case, “Join 
hands here as we may, one of the hands is mine, the other yours.”14 
Appeal to shared criteria can be disappointing, as it offers no “proof” of a sci-
entific or deductive sort for the reality of, say, others’ minds and their pain; and in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12. The idea of “denial” here may be inconsistent with classical forms of Pyrrhonian and 
Academic skepticism, too. I think other formulations, however, commonly accepted or, better, enlisted 
by skeptics remain consistent with Cavell’s point — formulations, for example, such as “destabilizing” 
criteria, subjecting criteria to skeptical “epoch!” or “suspension” or “doubt.”  
13. If writing in unqualified ways about skeptical conclusions distances Cavell from ancient 
skepticism, acknowledging the openness of criteria may be a way to align Cavell’s thought with it, at 
least that of the ancient Pyrrhonians, who advocated adopting a posture of being “zetetic” or open. 
Zetetic openness is, according to Sextus Empiricus (fl. late 2nd century), one of the characteristic ways 
Pyrrhonian skeptics practice skepticism. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, in Sextus 
Empiricus, edited and translated by R. G. Bury, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1953), 1.3.7 [Book 1, Chapter 3, line 7]: “The Sceptic School, then is also called 
‘Zetetic’ from its activity in investigation and inquiry.” Hereafter, “PH.” 
14. “If C. L. Barber is right […] in finding that the point of comedy is to put society back in 
touch with nature, then this is one ground on which comedy and tragedy stand together […]. The 
tragedy is that comedy has its limits. This is part of the sadness within comedy; the emptiness after a 
long laugh. Join hands here as we may, one of the hands is mine, the other yours”; from “The 
Avoidance of Love: A Reading of King Lear,” in Cavell, Disowning Knowledge in Seven Plays of 
Shakespeare (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003; the 1987 edition was Six Plays …), 110. 
Hereafter, “DK.” 
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this disappointment there are “natural” reasons for finding the appeals OLP (ordi-
nary language philosophy) makes empty and the universality of its voice a sham (CR 
90). We may, in fact, wish it to be so. It is insufficient, therefore, and even dangerous 
on Cavell’s account to demand a philosophical conclusion that will purge the scene of 
skepticism — under the false pretense that skeptical doubts are unnatural, that rea-
son is always local, that the epistemologists’ context is a false or “non-claim” context, 
that language includes indubitable “hinge” or “framework” propositions to settle our 
doubts, that we possess innate “clear and distinct” ideas certified by God or common 
sense or nous, that the transcendental conditions for the possibility of something pre-
clude doubt, etc., etc., etc. Skeptical doubt and its avoidance of meaning for Cavell—
its possibility at the very least — are rooted in the natural meaningfulness of human 
existence itself. 
2. Nature and Recovering Ordinary, Common Life.15 Paul Grimstad points 
out, rightly I think, that Cavell’s disappointment with empiricism and what he re-
gards as its “paltry” understanding of experience is a disappointment with represen-
tationalism — in Kant’s, Descartes’s, Locke’s, and others’ portraying the objects of ex-
perience merely as perceptions — a criticism drawn long beforehand by Scottish 
common sense philosopher Thomas Reid (1710-96) and two hundred years later by 
Cavell’s teacher, ordinary language philosopher J. L. Austin (1911-60), against Hume 
and the positivists.16 Once one adopts a representationalist position such as Descar-
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15. One might figure this recovery as Cavell’s and Hume’s therapeutic project. Wittgenstein, of 
course, is well known for advancing a model of philosophy as therapy; see, for example, Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, ed. Rush Rhees and G. E. M. Anscombe, trans. G. E. M. 
Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953; revised 2001), §133, hereafter “PI.”  Romanticism, with 
which Cavell also aligns himself, is also commonly understood to prescribe turning to the natural 
world in therapeutic ways. See James F. Peterman, Philosophy as Therapy: An Interpretation and 
Defense of Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophical Project (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992). The ancient 
Pyrrhonian skeptics, too, presented their practice as a kind of therapy, and so it is perhaps no accident 
that Sextus Empiricus’s is associated with empiric medicine. 
16. Paul Grimstad, “Emerson Discomposed: Skepticism, Naturalism, and the Search for 
Criteria in ‘Experience’,” 163-76 in R. Eldridge and  B. Rhie (eds.), Stanley Cavell and Literary 
Studies: The Consequences of Skepticism (New York: Continuum, 2011). See also Thomas Reid’s 
Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (1785) and J. L. Austin’s Sense and Sensibilia (1962). Reid 
writes: “qualities must necessarily be in something that is figured, coloured, hard or soft, that moves or 
resists. It is not to these qualities, but to that which is the subject of them, that we give the name body. 
If any man should think fit to deny that these things are qualities, or that they require any subject, I 
leave him to enjoy his opinion as a man who denies first principles, and is not fit to be reasoned with”; 
Reid (1785), 18: Essay 1, Chapter 2, “Principles Taken For Granted.”  And Reid appeals to nature, too 
— but not, as Hume does, to the natural relations among ideas; rather for Reid, the appeal is to a 
natural relation between words and things: “That without a natural knowledge of the connection 
between these [natural] signs and the things signified by them, language could never have been 
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tes’s and Locke’s “Way of Ideas,” an approach to experience ultimately rooted in Gas-
sendi and the atomist tradition,17 skepticism is a natural, even logical, result: “for all 
the glory of transcendental idealism, it still requires that things in themselves drop 
out of the picture (to this gift from Kant Cavell has replied: ‘thanks for nothing’).”18  
Early modern representationalism, according to this kind of OLP criticism, 
prejudges and distorts our relationship to the world and to others by establishing 
from the outset a metaphysical “gap,” a “lack” that is purportedly always already pre-
sent and can never be overcome. If one’s starting point is that human beings perceive 
only perceptions, rather than external objects, one will never reach others and the ex-
ternal world — and Cavell wishes to reach others and the world, to restore ourselves 
to the world and to the community we have always already inhabited (where else 
could we be?). Cavell writes in “An Emerson Mood,” seeming to balance or oscillate 
among individual, collective, and universal voices19 — ordinary language philoso-
phers’, his, everyone’s: “What the ordinary language philosopher is feeling — but I 
mean to speak just for myself in this — is that our relation to the world’s existence is 
somehow closer than the ideas of believing and knowing are made to convey” — espe-
cially ideas of believing and “knowing” as they are defined by epistemologists and 
early modern philosophers working through the Way of Ideas.20 
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invented and established among men; […] which we may call the natural language of mankind”; 
Thomas Reid’s 1764  An Inquiry in to the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense, ed. D. R. 
Brookes (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997), 51, from Chapter 4, Section 3 (“Of Natural 
Signs”), paragraph 35.  Cf. Reid on the same page (1764): “And if mankind had not these notions by 
nature, and natural signs to express them by, with all their wit and ingenuity they could never have 
invented language”; 51 (Section 2). For a similar, more contemporary view of the relation between 
language and the world compare Richard Fleming, First Word Philosophy: Wittgenstein-Austin-
Cavell, Writings on Ordinary Metaphysics (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 2004). 
17. Richard H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1979; expanded edn. from Savonarola to Bayle in 2003), 99ff., 141ff. 
18. Grimstad, “Emerson Discomposed,” 165. Cavell’s gratitude for Kant’s exchanging things 
themselves for phenomena is expressed in his “Emerson, Coleridge, Kant (Terms and Conditions),” in 
Stanley Cavell, Emerson’s Transcendental Etudes (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2003), 69.  
Hereafter “ETE”; cited at Grimstad, “Emerson Discomposed,” 250n13. 
19. The very politics of speaking for others is problematized by Linda Martín Alcoff, ”The 
Problem of Speaking for Others,” Culture Critique 20 (1991-92): 5-32; and also by R. M. Berry, “‘Is ‘Us’ 
Me?’ Cultural Studies and the Universality of Aesthetic Judgments,” 30-46 in R. Eldridge and B. Rhie 
(eds.), Stanley Cavell and Literary Studies: Consequences of Skepticism (New York: Continuum, 
2011). Cf. n32 below. 
20. “An Emerson Mood,” ETE 22 (compare MWM 96). This passage also appears in “The 
Ordinary as the Uneventful,” Themes out of School: Effects and Causes (San Francisco: North Point 
Press, 1984), 192-93 (hereafter, “TOS”), the repetition apparently confirming Cavell’s enduring 
satisfaction with he passage. In addition, at TOS 193, Cavell goes on in a passage shortened in ETE: 
“This sense of, let me say, my natural relation to existence is what Thoreau means by our being next to 
the laws of nature, by our neighboring the world, by our being beside ourselves. Emerson’s idea of the 
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Cavell is fascinated by his/our “natural relation to nature” or “natural relation 
to existence,” that  “intimacy with existence, or intimacy lost” (ETE 23; TOS 193) 
among people and between people and the world that modern epistemology and 
modern skepticism deny.  Across his career, especially through his naturalism, Cavell 
has explored that intimacy — its recovery as well as its loss — offering an account, or 
perhaps more accurately an accounting, that he thinks Wittgenstein and Austin, even 
in their “formidable attack on skepticism” (TOS 192), failed to provide (as well as an 
explanation in response to Hume’s “failure” to explain the character of skeptical 
doubt, MWM 61). Cavell signals this project in remarks such as this from his 1989 
This New Yet Unapproachable America: “Austin’s and Wittgenstein’s attacks on phi-
losophy, and on skepticism in particular — in appealing to what they call the ordinary 
or everyday use of words — are counting on some intimacy between language and 
world that they were never able satisfactorily to give an account of.”21 
Hannah Arendt points out in “On Humanity in Dark Times” that in some con-
texts the very stating of something is meaningful only because what is named has 
been denied or is in question.22 So, for example, in the U.S. Civil Rights movement, it 
was meaningful for African Americans to proclaim, “I am a man!” precisely because 
that standing had been denied or problematized. That Cavell names the “ordinary” 
and Hume “common life,” similarly, is meaningful because both philosophers have 
found it to have become lost or threatened or refused and wish to recover it so as 
achieve what Cavell calls, in “The Uncanniness of the Everyday,” a “resettlement” 
(QO 176). Cavell sets before himself, then, the labor not only of exploring, interrogat-
ing, but also in some fashion of restoring the intimacy between inquirers (the mean-
ing of the Greek skeptikoi) and the world as well as each other, rectifying a kind of 
loss at the hands of epistemology he, like Hume, confronts — a special kind of aliena-
tion expressed in terms of modern skepticism. Cavell writes, as if in response to a 
commonly imagined Hume: “I understand ordinary language philosophy not as an 
effort to reinstate vulgar beliefs, or common sense, to a pre-scientific position of emi-
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near is one of the inflections he gives to the common, the low, as in the passage from Nature 
beginning: ‘I ask not for the great, the remotes, the romantic… I embrace the common, I explore and 
sit at the feet of the familiar, the low. Give me insight into today, and you may have the antique and 
future worlds.’” 
21. Quoted by Russell B. Goodman, Contending with Stanley Cavell (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 91; NYUA 81. 
22. Hannah Arendt, “Humanity in Dark Times: Thoughts on Lessing,” 3-23 in Men in Dark 
Times (San Diego: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1968); originally published 1959. 
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nence, but to reclaim the human self from its denial and neglect by modern philoso-
phy […]. My hopes are to suggest an answer in the arena of traditional philosophical 
skepticism, and to suggest that the Wittgensteinian view of language (together with 
an Austinian practice of it), and of philosophy, is an assault upon that denial” (CR 
154).23   
But Hume does not just aspire to reinstating “vulgar” pre-philosophical beliefs. 
In his 1779 Dialogues concerning Natural Religion he writes (in the voice of Philo) 
that “if a man has accustomed himself to sceptical considerations on the uncertainty 
and narrow limits of reason, he will not entirely forget them when he turns his reflec-
tion on other subjects” — even though we may wish to forget skepticism’s lessons.24 It 
is central to Hume’s thought that our response to loss of a skeptical kind may be well 
or poorly considered, perhaps we might say less or more forgetful.25 Skepticism 
emerges naturally for Hume through philosophical reflection when people depart 
from the customs and habits of common life, underwritten by the press of natural 
propensities. Skepticism is lived, if not radically “cur’d,” conversely, for Hume by a 
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23. At TOS 192, Cavell similarly writes: “It was always being said, and I believe it is still felt, 
that Wittgenstein’s and Austin’s return to ordinary language constitutes an anti-intellectual or 
unscientific defense of ordinary beliefs. While this is a significantly wrong idea it is hard to say what is 
wrong with it.” In his essay, “Declining Decline: Wittgenstein as a Philosopher of Culture,” Cavell as if 
following this thought writes: “It would a little better express my sense of Wittgenstein’s practice if we 
translate the idea of bringing words back as leading them back, shepherding them [back to their 
Heimat] […]. But the translation is only a little better, because the behavior of words is not something 
separate from our lives, those of us who are native to them, in mastery of them. The lives themselves 
have to return”; section on “Everydayness as Home,” Part I of NYUA, 34-35. 
24. David Hume, Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, ed. Norman Kemp Smith (New 
York: Bobbs Merrill, 1947), I.8. 134; hereafter “D” (originally published 1779). That we may wish to 
forget, that we often flee skeptical philosophy’s acknowledgment of finitude was called to my mind by 
an anonymous reviewers quoting the 1976 Preface to the Updated Edition of MWM: “If philosophy is 
esoteric , that is not because a few men guard its knowledge but because most men guard themselves 
against it” (xxvii). 
25. Writing about the importance of not forgetting the lessons of skepticism while also 
acknowledging the inevitability of that “fault,” Hume cautions his readers about his reluctant and 
occasional slipping into dogmatic forms of expression: “On such an occasion we are apt not only to 
forget our scepticism, but even our modesty too; and make use of such terms as these, ’tis evident, ’tis 
certain, ’tis undeniable; which a due deference to the public ought, perhaps, to prevent. I may have 
fallen into this fault after the example of others; but I here enter a caveat against any objections, which 
may be offer’d on that head; and declare that such expressions were extorted from me by the present 
view of the object, and imply no dogmatical spirit, nor conceited idea of my own judgment, which are 
sentiments that I am sensible can become no body, and a sceptic still less than any other” (T 1.4.7.15, 
SBN 273-74). Might Hume have been alluding in this important reference to not forgetting at the 
closing of Book 1 of the Treatise to the way Sextus Empiricus describes skeptics’ non-dogmatic use of 
language as a form skeptical “recollection” (hypomnema), the remembering only of appearances (e.g. 
PH 2.10.102). In this Sextus may be contrasting skepticism, perhaps in an ironic way, with Plato’s 
description of dogmatic knowing as recollection (anamnesis). Plato himself, in a passage that 
fascinates Derrida, contrasts anamnesis unfavorably with mere hypomnema; see Plato, Phaedrus 
(275a), and Jacques Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy,” Tel Quel 32 & 33 (1968): 18-59. 
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reflective return to the natural and customary common life (nature and custom being 
the Pyrrhonian guide or “criterion” for skeptical practice).26 Returning to common 
life for Hume, however, is not just surrender to what cannot be resisted; common life 
for Hume is to be “methodized and corrected”27 in light of skepticism on the basis of 
reflectively generated standards (e.g., “general rules” of a “second influence”; T 
1.3.13.12, SBN 149-50). Hume’s “blind submission” (T 1.4.7.10, SBN 269), therefore, 
is less blind than his well known remark suggests and shelters within itself an ac-
knowledgment (though not quite a transcendental argument) that the press of the 
natural in common life constitutes the very condition of the possibility of thinking, 
acting, and meaning. It underwrites the “legitimate ground of assent,”28 the “title” for 
reason’s authority (T 1.4.7.11, SBN 270), since reason cannot establish its own war-
rant, even the warrant or “authority” of skeptical arguments themselves (T 1.4.1.12, 
SBN 186-87).29   
Strawson is struck, along just these lines, by Hume’s recognition that “’tis vain 
to ask Whether there be body or not? That is a point we must take for granted in all our 
reasonings” (T 1.4.2.1, SBN 187), concluding from this that Hume understands natural 
beliefs to be basic to the “framework” of any possible epistemological investigation and 
therefore immune to skepticism.30 Hume for Strawson is schizophrenic; the skeptical 
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26. Sextus Empiricus, whom Hume will largely follow in this, describes the Pyrrhonian 
“fourfold” criterion for life this way: “Adhering, then, to appearances we live in accordance with the 
normal rules of life, undogmatically, seeing that we cannot remain wholly inactive.  And it would seem 
that this regulation of life is fourfold, and that one part of it lies in the guidance of Nature, another in 
the constraint of the passions, another in the tradition of laws and customs, another in the instruction 
of the arts.  Nature's guidance is that by which we are naturally capable of sensation and thought; 
constraint of the passions is that whereby hunger drives us to food and thirst to drink; tradition of 
customs and laws, that whereby we regard piety in the conduct of life as good, but impiety as evil; 
instruction of the arts, that whereby we are not inactive in such arts as we adopt. But we make all these 
statements undogmatically” (PH 1.11.23-24). 
27. Hume, Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2000), 12.25, SBN 61. Hereafter “E.” Originally published in 1748. 
28. A phrase Hume uses in his 10 March 1751 letter to Gilbert Elliot. For a discussion of how 
this important phrase plays out in debates about Hume’s skepticism and realism, see John P. Wright, 
“Scepticism, Causal Science, and the ‘Old Hume’,” The Journal of Scottish Philosophy 10.2 (2012): 
123-42: “What is key in this response for our present discussion is the fact that Hume contrasts these 
weak tendencies with the strong and universal propensities of the imagination which make us believe 
in our senses and experience. These latter provide us with what, in his letter, Hume calls ‘a legitimate 
Ground of Assent’” (129). For Hume’s phrase see J. Y. T. Greig, The Letters of David Hume: 1727-65 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1932), 155, Letter #72. 
29. Don Garrett has established an influential interpretation of Humean naturalism a long 
these lines through what he calls Hume’s “title principle” for reason; Garrett Cognition and 
Commitment, 234-37. 
30.  Strawson, Scepticism and Naturalism, 11. Not considering the possibility of a naturalism 
that is also a skepticism (perhaps strangely given the title of his book), Strawson reads “an unresolved 
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Hume arguing independently from Hume the naturalist. In this interpretation, though, 
Strawson somehow ignores the first sentence of the paragraph he cites, where Hume 
affirms himself a skeptic at the same time he acknowledges the existence of body: 
“Thus the sceptic still continues to reason and believe, even tho’ he cannot defend his 
reason by reason” (emph. mine). Contrary to Strawson’s account, then, Hume’s natu-
ralism is a skeptical naturalism that implies “no dogmatical spirit, nor conceited idea 
of” the epistemological powers of his “judgment” (T 1.4.7.15, SBN 274). We might say, 
therefore, that for Hume upon a skeptical acknowledgment of the natural pivots phi-
losophy’s education about what he calls “true philosophy,” true skeptical philosophy.31  
Skepticism arises naturally for Cavell with a loss of the alignment expressed in 
shared criteria and a related sense of gap, of being sealed off. The sense of gap can 
spring from a wish or a misconceived, even morally dubious, project: “this sense of 
gap originates in an attempt, or wish, to escape (to remain a ‘stranger’ to, ‘alienated’ 
from) those shared forms of life, to give up responsibility of their maintenance” (CR 
109). Suffering this alienation, people are realigned and re-attuned, for Cavell, by re-
minding them through examples of their agreement, by carefully reading their words 
and expressions, by resisting the natural disappointments of human epistemic life, 
and by acknowledging the agreement already presupposed by human forms of life, 
including by doubt: “the gap between mind and world is closed, or the distortion be-
tween them straightened, in the appreciation and acceptance of particular human 
forms of life, human ‘convention’” (CR 109).32 
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tension in Hume’s position” that results in “two Humes: Hume the skeptic and Hume the naturalist; 
where Hume’s naturalism […] appears as something like a refuge from his skepticism” (12). For 
Strawson’s Hume: “Our inescapable natural commitment is to a general frame of belief and to a 
general style (the inductive) of belief-formation” (14). Quassim Cassam quotes Strawson describing his 
account of Hume here in a later autobiographical essay thus: “In common with Hume and 
Wittgenstein (and even Heidegger) I [Strawson] argued that the attempt to combat such doubts by 
rational argument was misguided: for we are dealing here with the presuppositions, the framework, of 
all human thought and enquiry”; Peter F. Strawson, “Intellectual Autobiography of P. F. Strawson,” in 
Lewis Edwin Hahn (ed.), The Philosophy of P. F. Strawson (Chicago and Lasalle: Open Court, 2008), 
17. 
31. See Donald W. Livingston, Philosophical Melancholy and Delirium: Hume’s Pathology of 
Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998): see especially Chapter 2, “The Dialectic of 
True and False Philosophy”; and Chapter 7, “True Philosophy and the Skeptical Tradition.” 
Wittgenstein, also distinguishes his practice from something akin to false philosophy, writing in 
Philosophical Investigations of breaking off [abzubrechen] from something like false philosophy (or at 
least from the relentless and futile self-questioning of philosophy) through a “real discovery” that 
“gives philosophy” something like Pyrrhonian ataraxia (“die Philosophie zur Ruhe [quietude or rest] 
bringt”), PI §133. 
32.  Cf. Donald W. Livingston, Hume’s Philosophy of Common Life (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1984). Consider also Wittgenstein's usage of general agreement (die Menschen überein) 
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The idea of agreement here is not that of coming to or arriving at an agreement 
on a given occasion, but of being in agreement throughout, being in harmony, 
like pitches or tones, or clocks, of weighing scales or columns of figures. That a 
group of human beings stimmen in their language überein says, so to speak, 
that they are mutually attuned top to bottom. (CR 32) 
 
This sort of harmony early modern naturalists and others are apt to conceive (or 
imagine) as a metaphysical fact (the flip-side of conceiving people to be metaphysi-
cally and totally alien or different from one another);33 but for Cavell human align-
ment is not an enduring fact but a continuing “task,” one that sustains an unspon-
sored and contingent achievement, and one that may be motivated by an aspiration 
to moral perfection: “One can think of romanticism as the discovery that the everyday 
is an exceptional achievement. Call it the achievement of the human” (CR 463).34 
Paradoxically, for Cavell people can only achieve attunement and “return”35 
and (re)convene by acknowledging, among the various natural dimensions of human 
existence, “separateness” from each other, distance from the rest of the world — fini-
tude. More paradoxically still, the very effort to overcome that separateness, distance, 
and finitude through argument and metaphysics deepens and rarefies them. In the 
recognition, then, of natural human finitude, including the natural dangers of skepti-
cal loss, there lies the possibility for a kind of paradoxical gain, what Cavell calls “an 
intimacy of difference” (PoH 103); for, as it is with divorce and (re)marriage, “not till 
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as well as “form of life” (Lebensform) in the singular, perhaps indicating the human form of life shared 
universally:  “‘So you are saying that human agreement [die Übereinstimmung der Menschen] decides 
what is true and what is false?’—It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in 
the language they use [in der Sprache stimmen die Menschen überein].  That is not agreement 
[Übereinstimmung] in opinions but in form of life [der Lebensform],” PI §241. 
33. Richard Fleming, First Word Philosophy: “It is with the existence of criteria that ordinary 
metaphysical reminders can begin and with them that we find not madness but silence, the silent 
harmony that makes possible all that we do” (32), “A silent harmony of humans and the world stands 
firm amidst our talk and action” (33). 
34. In the essay, “Makavejev on Bergman,” Cavell illustrates his understanding of the role 
nature plays in the formation of meaning when he compares directors as if he were comparing (1) 
poorly educated realists and skeptics against (2) his own OLP way of discernment: “The former [1] 
seek to fix or to flout significance, perhaps to suggest that significance is necessarily private or public 
or arbitrary or infinite or nonexistent. The latter [2] propose significance as the intersection of nature 
and history, as a task of continuous and unfolding interpretations, each felt as complete and each 
making possible the next, until a human form of life fits together”; TOS 117. 
35. Cavell, “Postscript to “The Investigations’ Everyday Aesthetics of Itself,” 275-79 in Mario 
De Caro and D. Macarthur (eds.), Naturalism in Question (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2004), 277. 
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we have lost the world, do we begin to find ourselves” (NYUA 36).36 Call it the Wal-
den paradox.37 
 
It is to those who accept this condition of human existence that the writer ac-
cords the title of traveler or stranger […]. Here is another underlying percep-
tion, or paradox, of Walden as a whole — that what is most intimate is what is 
furthest away; the realization of “our infinite relations,” our kinships, is an 
endless realization of our separateness […]. (SW 54) 
 
If the first step in what Cavell calls philosophy as “education for grownups” is to take 
inventory of our estrangement from ourselves, the “second step is to grasp the true 
necessity of human strangeness as such,” and with it “the opportunity for outward-
ness” (SW 55). We are separate but not, however, for Cavell, as for Derrida, always 
and already totally “other” to one another (radically and metaphysically alien), lack-
ing the capacity really to know, or understand, or really to commune with one an-
other. We can already acknowledge our being separate but not totally “other” because 
worries about separation would not themselves be possible without human beings 
already sharing a meaningful language and human criteria. Separateness, therefore, 
does not entail absolute difference but rather the necessity of outward expression and 
the need to read it. 
Cavell’s appeal to shared criteria and natural agreement may seem analogous 
to Strawson’s appeal to our epistemological background “framework,” but the Cavel-
lian gesture differs from Strawson’s because it does not aspire to purge human life or 
inquiry of skeptical doubt. Fear of separateness and the confrontation with separate-
ness to which philosophy brings us may account for the human wish to flee, but to 
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36. Cavell here quoting from henry David Thoreau’s Walden (1854). The phrase “an intimacy 
of difference” appears in Cavell’s essay, “Knowledge as Transgression,” on Frank Capra’s 1934 film, It 
Happened One Night; PoH 103. 
37. I wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for the following thought along these lines: “The 
danger of reading Cavell on skepticism is the propensity for his views on what accounts for skepticism, 
what ‘living it’ entails, to be misconstrued. […] Where it is often thought that we get into trouble by 
failing to accept our finitude, […] accepting our finitude is not to put an end to skepticism — but to 
acknowledge it in a certain way, in a sense, to cohabitate with a fair amount of fear and trembling, and 
dread, for life.” Why that is so stands for me still as a persistent question — why the difficulty of that 
acceptance, why we both wish for and flee exposure and intimacy, why they remain for us both among 
the grounds of our epistemological and moral demands as well as a cause for profound anxiety and 
dread. The answer is, as I am inclined to argue, just the terms of our natural separateness and finitude 
— the human fate skeptical philosophy acknowledges. 
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deny our separateness and the persistent possibility of skeptical loss through episte-
mological argument or metaphysical posits (or even through appeals to the everyday 
or to nature in the way Strawson et al. conceive nature) transforms our skeptical hu-
man finitude into an epistemological problem and deepens the vulnerabilities it ex-
poses.  
 
Speaking together face to face can seem to deny that distance, to deny that fac-
ing one another requires acknowledging the presence of the other, revealing 
our positions, betraying them if need be. But to deny such things is to deny our 
separateness. And that makes us fictions of one another. (SW 65)  
 
Denying the separateness of our finitude deepens it and totalizes it in the same way 
Derrida, despite his pretensions to the contrary, extends rather than subverts the 
early modern metaphysical condition. As Cavell puts it: “The necessity of the task is 
the choice of finitude, which for us (even after God) means the acknowledgment of 
the existence of finite others, which is to say the choice of community, of autonomous 
moral existence” (CR 464).38 
Both Cavell and Hume then find skeptical doubt to be natural; and they both 
appeal to what they find, what impresses itself, as natural dimensions of human exis-
tence in order to recover the ordinary (in Cavell) or common life (in Hume). Neither 
philosopher, however, thinks that skepticism can be completely overcome or purged 
or resolved, even by the natural. For Cavell, the potential for skeptical doubts is in-
trinsic to the very criteria that make human language, thought, and action possible. 
That is, the very conditions for the possibility of meaning make meaning vulnerable 
to skepticism. Sustaining meaning requires ongoing expression, re-reading, and re-
agreement. For Hume, the natural impulse to epistemological thinking and the natu-
ral trajectory of epistemological thinking are toward skepticism. Natural relations of 
ideas provide the “cement of the universe,” but those relations are unsponsored and 
contingent, always subject to potential rupture. Since neither reason nor the senses 
can refute skeptical doubt, human beings must accept an ongoing fragility and open-
ness to their inquiries as well as the potential for doubt. That Cavell and Hume reach 
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38. I am grateful to Dr. Chiara Alfano for the helpful suggestions she has offered me on Cavell, 
skepticism, naturalism, and separateness. 
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such similar conclusions through such different philosophical approaches not only 
enriches an understanding of the dynamics of skeptical thinking. It may also point to 
something of the “truth of skepticism.” 
CONVERSATIONS 3!
American Experience: Cavell’s Paths  






For Cavell, American transcendentalism and film share the capacity to provide an 
education in taking an interest in one’s experience. The results of such interest are for 
him ultimately political, allowing for self-cultivation and hence for mutual progress; 
an aspiration both romantic and liberal. However, the meeting of an experiential 
focus with political hopes extends beyond Cavell, and the wider fact of this conver-
gence allows us to conceive his project as part of a broader milieu. One way to think 
Cavell historically is to consider some of the contexts in which his voice was forged. 
Although he sometimes alludes to it, we don’t readily associate Cavell with 1960s 
radicalism, the counterculture, or the New Left. His sensibility and concerns seem 
more abstract than this, and operate on other planes than activism or polemic. His 
voice also unmistakably belongs to both a disciplinary training in philosophy (specifi-
cally, a 1950s analytic context) and to an earlier generation. Yet granting the unmis-
takable significance of these, we can still observe that despite his originality, and his 
anomalousness as an analytic philosopher, Cavell is not an a-contextual voice in 
American letters. He is not alone in exploring the value of attention to (American) 
experience as a resource for improvement, a fact to which he himself draws notice. 
Further, he anticipates certain developments in our critical present centred around 
the possibilities for a tone of hope and optimism with more than personal implica-
tions.  
Cavell’s interest in both liberal and transcendentalist versions of community, 
and tropes of hope and despair for American liberals, have some added resonance 
now. As historian Wendy Wall points out, from “the mid-1990s, and particularly 
since 2001, there has been a resurgent interest in the kinds of questions that pre-
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occupied Americans between the mid-1930s and the early 1960s.”1 Of course, Cavell 
began writing much earlier than this renewed interest in what George Packer has 
called an extended “Roosevelt republic” and what it might have offered in terms of 
liberal solutions, and generated in imaginaries, began.2 However, perhaps in places 
Cavell’s project shares, not the sentiment of nostalgia itself, but concerns in common 
with a contemporary “nostalgia for an earlier age — roughly the period from the New 
Deal through the key legislative victories of the civil rights movement.” Wall suggests 
that the story of these times is “a bit more complex” than that of a country united by 
“common dreams,” an era of unity that can be looked back to for inspiration. Instead, 
“Americans of that era were indeed united, but above all, by a quest for common 
ground.”3 When Cavell speaks of America as ‘our unattained but attainable common-
wealth’, he consciously references something that has never existed.4 Much hinges on 
the importance of this distinction. But because of its focus on and composition during 
certain eras, his work on Hollywood film also reflects changes in ideas of US national 
community as a goal. 
As Timothy Gould notes, there is “a tension between the eschatology of perfec-
tion, with its intermittent victory over despair, and the more normal canons of his-
torical descent and inheritance.”5 Since even the idea of perfectionist instants has its 
own kind of historicity, I’d suggest that the thematics of hope and despair in Cavell’s 
writing are suffused with context. One important American context for stepping into 
a “transformed mood” is of course transcendentalism.6 The notional possibility of 
brief ecstatic reprieves, usually made possible in Cavell’s work by artworks or music, 
belongs to a romantic project positing that the aesthetic (including scenes in films as 
well as certain kinds of writing) might provide a transhistorical space of transfigura-
tion from which to gain better purchase on comprehensive political or social change 
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1. Wendy L. Wall, Inventing the American Way: The Politics of Consensus from the New Deal 
to the Civil Rights Movement (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 290.  
2. See George Packer, The Unwinding: An Inner History of the New America (London: Faber 
and Faber, 2013).    
3. Wall, Inventing 290.  
4. Cavell, Cities of Words: Pedagogical Letters on a Register of the Moral Life (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 69.   
5. Timothy Gould, unpublished review of Stanley Cavell’s American Dream: Shakespeare, 
Philosophy, and Hollywood Movies, by Lawrence Rhu, http://olponline.org/2010/08/19/tim-gould-
reviews-lawrence-rhus-stanley-cavells-american-dream-previously-unpublished/   
6. Cavell, “The Good of Film,” in Cavell on Film, ed. William Rothman (New York: State Uni-
versity of New York Press, 2005), 344.  
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in the broadest sense. But another important context here for hope and despair re-
lates to American liberal aspiration of a more historically situated kind.   
Cavell’s engagement with the hope and despair of the transcendentalists took 
shape against a particular background. His interests in both film and American trans-
cendentalism began to come to fruition during the 1960s, a time when liberal hope 
and transcendentalism were linked by American artists and theorists. The conver-
gence of experiential and politically liberal themes was also a wider phenomenon of 
the times in the US, as for example in the espousal of both existentialism and Ameri-
can romanticism by student activists, where a perception of a “lost” America co-
existed with a concern not to be “lost” to one’s own experience. Cavell explicitly links 
his beginning to write about film, too, to questions of bildung. It is a key part of his 
narrative of coming into selfhood specifically as a writer, and into aesthetic, and con-
currently political, education: terms very similar to those in which he conceives the 
impact of transcendentalism on him. As he explains, when he began to write about 
film philosophically, in the late 1960s, the external “ambience” generated by the Viet-
nam conflict and the civil rights movement informed his writing about it alongside 
the cues he was taking from Wittgenstein’s and Austin’s work.7  
During the composition of The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of 
Film, which appeared in 1971, Cavell was simultaneously immersed in rereading 
Thoreau’s Walden, and he has asserted that he wouldn’t have felt entitled to write the 
ensuing The Senses of Walden (1972) had he not taken part in the Freedom Summer 
of 1964, during which he gave classes at Tougaloo College. Pointing out in his mem-
oirs that his primary response to a political crisis is generally “psychological,” Cavell 
concludes that had he not acted at that particular time, in that moment of decision 
about the nation, it would have amounted to a declaration of having no “political de-
sires at all.”8 Although, then, the background to the gestation of Cavell’s first books 
on both transcendentalism and on film was a context of political upheaval and civil 
rights activism, to claim Cavell himself for activism would be an overstatement. How-
ever, his comment here suggests that the issue of segregation went beyond that dis-
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7.  Andrew Klevan, “What Becomes of Thinking on Film? (Stanley Cavell in Conversation with 
Andrew Klevan),” Film as Philosophy: Essays in Cinema After Wittgenstein and Cavell, ed. Rupert 
Read and Jerry Goodenough (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 192. 
8. Cavell, Little Did I Know: Excerpts from Memory (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2010), 430. 
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tinction for him, its abolition being a prerequisite for any meaningful national con-
versation to begin.  
Gould’s comment about canons of inheritance is made in a review of Law-
rence Rhu’s Stanley Cavell’s American Dream: Shakespeare, Philosophy, and 
Hollywood Movies, in which Rhu argues that “Cavell is an American dreamer of a 
recognizable kind.” When Gould writes of Rhu that his work confirms that “Cavell’s 
America is more than a dream if still less than the eventual community we had 
hoped for,” this interesting use of the past pluperfect (‘had hoped’) allows us to infer 
that the “we” who wished for eventual community refers specifically to the genera-
tion of intellectuals slightly younger than Cavell who came of age during the 1960s, 
raising the idea of a lost wish or possibility as a generational experience.9 Another 
scholar, intellectual historian James Kloppenberg, poses a question about the 
struggle to find a productive register in the face of liberal disappointment that also 
seems relevant here. “Many of us who came of age in America during the war in 
Vietnam urged our elders to stop seeing the world through a World War II-induced 
reflexive pro-Americanism,” Kloppenberg observes, going on to ask: “Can we now 
stop seeing our past through an equally distorting Vietnam-induced reflexive anti-
Americanism? Can we acknowledge that indignation and cynicism too can obstruct 
critical understanding?”10 Kloppenberg’s most recent book is an exploration of 
Obama’s debt to American philosophical pragmatism, though since its publication, 
some may argue the Obama administration has added some causes for liberal des-
pair. What is at stake in his comments about cynicism is the struggle to find a regis-
ter that is productive without being complicit, hopeful without being purblind, and 
restorative without being culpable. Cavell explicitly identified this issue and thema-
tised it before others have, finding his own solution in the incorporation of Emer-
son’s voice, characterised as an optimistic valence that is won back from, and has 
passed through, tragic knowledge, an alternative to either cynicism or oblivious-
ness.  
Cavell’s own “audacity of hope” is in general less identified with immediate 
circumstance, being rather a transcendental open-ended hopefulness, allowing for 
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9. Gould, review, http://olponline.org/2010/08/19/tim-gould-reviews-lawrence-rhus-stanley-
cavells -american-dream-previously-unpublished/. 
10. James T. Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1998), 19.   
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the ongoing possibility of change and improvement. However, his explicit comments 
on being politically “liberal” in his memoirs occur in connection with Vietnam and 
the student protests of the 1960s, and with questions of race relations in America. 
One of the few places in his work where he self-identifies specifically as “liberal” is in 
relation to a 1969 occupation at Harvard in protest against Vietnam:  
 
radicals and conservatives have reasons. Liberals like myself, with jerking 
knees and bleeding hearts, seem to have no reasons; merely, instead, to give 
interpretations. People will say that a time for talking comes to an end. Of 
course I would expect to have an interpretation of their saying so, since as long 
as there is time to say so there is time to listen and think.11 
  
The same year, Cavell and John Rawls intervened in another student protest, which 
resulted in their helping with the process of setting up the African American Studies 
programme at Harvard (Cornel West has even said that without Cavell, there would 
be no such department there, apparently in partial response to the question of 
whether Cavell has been conscious enough of matters of race in American cultural 
and political life).12 Rawls was Cavell’s longtime friend and colleague, and their work 
has been linked by critics and admirers alike. Cavell carefully distinguishes his work 
from Rawls’ around issues of perfectionism’s relation to democracy, but to some de-
gree his own reception has been caught up in questions of whether he himself is or 
isn’t a liberal thinker. Stephen Mulhall remarks that “Cavell’s picture of aesthetics, 
morality, and politics is essentially liberal,” but “this may be because […] aesthetic, 
moral, and political practice in the late twentieth century – are themselves inevitably 
and ineradicably liberal.”13 Arguably though, a specifically American sense of the “lib-
eral” pervades Cavell’s work at the level of contextual background in addition to this 
philosophical sense. 
In Little Did I Know, Cavell acknowledges himself as liberal, as well as high-
lighting the ways in which the external world of 1960s political events made its way 
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11. Cavell, Little, 507. 
12. Cavell and Paul Standish, “Stanley Cavell in Conversation with Paul Standish,” Journal of 
Philosophy of Education 46.2 (May 2012): 163.   
13. Stephen Mulhall, Stanley Cavell: Philosophy’s Recounting of the Ordinary (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 1994), 71.   
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into the classroom. In addition, as I have argued elsewhere, it is likely that the lib-
eralism of mid-century American intellectual culture was an important influence on 
his thinking (a differently qualified position than that of 1960s activism). But for Cav-
ell, such political liberalism doesn’t translate directly to his philosophy, owing both to 
the distinctive brief of philosophy, and to the work the transcendentalist register does 
in his project. Philosophy’s task, as Cavell defines it, is responsiveness to the fact of 
interest. This is different to the task of political advocacy, though what such response 
reveals may enable it. As he explains in Little Did I Know, “Perhaps prehistory is my 
medium, to give an account of the conditions, call it the context, that have to happen 
before something happens.”14 For Cavell, polemic is something other than philoso-
phy.15 The case he makes for the need to identity philosophy’s distinctive American 
locations accompanies a persistent distrust of speaking literally in a political register 
that has exposed him to censure, an issue not helped by the exceptionalist legacy of 
American romanticism. Nonetheless, the preparedness for mutual exposure ex-
pressed in speech (or writing) and response remain more primary for Cavell than 
specific political affiliation: “no amount of contribution is more valuable to the for-
mation and preservation of community than the willingness to contribute and the oc-
casion to be heard.”16  
If, then, we pinpoint certain high liberal moments, such as the mid-to late 
1960s, as important to his work, it would be misguided not to stress at the same time 
the enduring significance of the 1950s and early 1960s, the period in which forms of 
“ordinary language philosophy” emerged as a counterpoint to logical positivism, and 
in which Cavell was educated; he submitted his doctorate in 1961, having begun it ten 
years previously. As he outlines in the foreword to The Claim of Reason, this devel-
opment not only enabled him to find a way to “go on” in disciplinary terms, it cast 
new light on moral problems. However remote ordinary language philosophy may 
seem from some of Cavell’s other (and sometimes later) interests, we can’t hold it 
apart from them, since it is integral to the ethos by which those interests are inter-
preted. As Cavell explains the connection, as he sees it, between transcendentalism 
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14. Cavell, Little Did I Know, 511. 
15. Cavell, The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy (1979; New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1999), xiii. 
16. Cavell, Cities of Words: Pedagogical Letters on a Register of the Moral Life (Cambridge 
MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), 207.   
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and his debt to this other kind of thinking: “In Emerson, as in Wittgenstein’s Investi-
gations, I encounter the social in my every utterance and in each silence.”17 For him 
the philosophical quest for the ordinary and the search for political democracy each 
involve finding one’s voice and its reception by others. 
Explaining his dismay about his philosophical contemporaries’ readings of 
Wittgenstein as a conservative thinker, Cavell explains that he construes Wittgenstein 
as intent on a distinctive “task” of philosophy that is “resistant to philosophically vio-
lent change, namely, politically or ideologically sponsored change.”18 Ralph Berry 
points out that the first time Cavell directly responded to the charge that his teachers 
in ordinary language philosophy were “conservative” was in 1968, in the foreword to 
Must We Mean What We Say, which Berry describes, despite its focus on ordinary 
language philosophy, as “a very sixties book.”19 In this foreword, Cavell writes: “There 
is no revolutionary social vision that does not include a new vision of education; and 
contrariwise.”20 Education is key for Cavell as a locus of change. If OLP provides one 
picture for him of how instruction happens, film is also part of his idea of how phi-
losophy can be taught, as indeed is transcendentalism.  
Following the completion of The Senses of Walden, Cavell began studying the 
Hollywood remarriage comedies, and during this same period, he began reading Em-
erson in a committed way. The move from Thoreau to Emerson in Cavell is a move 
from a more phenomenological slant on American transcendentalism to a more per-
fectionist one. But this is a shift in stress rather than in wholesale intent. It isn’t until 
Pursuits of Happiness (and more explicitly still in Cities of Words) that Cavell’s film 
writing turns to Emersonian perfectionism as such. But if The World Viewed was 
somewhat informed by Cavell’s reading in Heidegger, and a phenomenological ap-
proach to experience, we can see in parts of the book that film is also already an 
impetus to his thinking about the American polis and its contradictions. Cavell 
speaks of the era when he began writing about film as one when, in light of the Viet-
nam conflict, “the worth of an American identity [itself] was under terrible question-
ing, of an intensity I suppose not reached since the Civil War and not approached 
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17. Cavell, Cities, 4. 
18. Cavell, Little, 478. 
19. Ralph M. Berry, “Cavell’s Meaning 1968,” Theory Trouble, spec. issue Symploke 11.1/2 
(2003): 241.   
20. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say: A Book of Essays, Updated Edition (1969; Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), xxxix.   
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again until the present era in Iraq,” identifying a dynamic of recurring legitimation 
crises running from the Civil War, through Vietnam, to the George W. Bush adminis-
tration.21  
These are moments, for him, of “deformation”: that is, not only moments of 
political disagreement, but of casting into doubt the viability of a more extensive 
understanding of the “project” of America (and indeed, of the Enlightenment pro-
ject, as these come together in his readings in Pursuits). As Shira Wolowsky has 
pointed out, in Cavell, as in Whitman, “the issue of skepticism appears not to be 
theoretically epistemological but […] concerned instead with questions of American 
culture, society and politics: that is, of civic decision and responsibility,” in the con-
text of a concern with the fragility of “joint national life.”22 Wolowsky is alluding to 
the strain of American writing in which the writer attempts to propose solutions to 
the problems of epistemology at the same time as those of society, where personal 
and political forms of skepticism, figured as loss and crisis, are intimately related. 
For Cavell, Thoreau’s Walden is a superlative instance of this approach, 
which he reads as “a book of losses” explored philosophically, losses linking a per-
sonal skeptical crisis and national failings.23 While we might expect to find this link 
in regard to a transcendentalist text, such losses and linkages are also alluded to in 
The World Viewed. Immediately following a passage about belief in the book is a 
passage in which historically located American anxieties sit very close to the skepti-
cal drama as such. A subtle elision is at work, whereby the ‘mind’ in general, Cavell’s 
own mind, and America’s mind — expressed in the first person plural “we” — be-
come identified:  
 
We no longer grant, or take it for granted, that men doing the work of the 
world together are working for the world’s good […] the stain of atomic blood 
will not wash and [...] its fallout is nauseating us beyond medicine, aging us 
very rapidly. It is the knowledge, and refusal to know, that we are ceding to 
Hitler and Stalin the permanent victories of the war […] in the spasms of our 
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21. Cavell, Little, 315. 
22. Shira Wolosky, “On Cavell on Whitman: On Cavell on Whitman: Questions about Applica-
tion,” Symposium: A Taste for Complexity, Common Knowledge 5 (Fall 1996): 63, 62.   
23. Cavell, In Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of Skepticism and Romanticism (Chicago: Univer-
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fixed fury we do ourselves no injury, in order not to see the injury we have 
done, and do. So the mind tears itself apart trying to pull free.24   
 
If during World War II America understood itself to be working for the world’s good, 
by the time of writing Cavell is beset with guilt about American acts of violence. The 
way this passage breaks into propria persona, and the connection drawn between skep-
ticism as such, and skepticism about America’s moral and political status, echo the 
well-known passage in the “The Avoidance of Love,” Cavell’s essay on King Lear, com-
posed in 1967, in he makes reference to Vietnam. Parts of “The Avoidance of Love” bear 
a striking resemblance to sociologist Robert Bellah’s celebrated essay, “Civil Religion in 
America,” also of 1967. There, Bellah refers to the moment of his writing as “the third 
time of trial” for the nation, the first two trials being the war of independence and the 
internal battle over slavery. Bewitched by its own power, America has for Bellah, in 
Vietnam, “stumbled into a military confrontation where we have come to feel that our 
honor is at stake.”25 Cavell shares a diagnosis with commentators such as Bellah, 
though it is tied in his own work to philosophical questions. 
In “The Avoidance of Love,” Cavell invokes America as the protagonist of its 
own tragedy, in its “insatiable” desire to be the object of love, and its skepticism about 
its own existence:  
 
Since it had a birth, it may die. It feels mortal. And it wishes proof not merely 
of its continuance but of its existence, a fact it has never been able to take for 
granted. Therefore its need for love is insatiable […] Those who voice politi-
cally radical wishes for this country may forget the radical hopes it holds for it-
self, and not know that the hatred of America by its intellectuals is only their 
own version of patriotism. It is the need for love as proof of its existence which 
makes it so frighteningly destructive […] and which makes it incapable of see-
ing that it is destructive and frightening. It imagines its evils to come from out-
side […] Union is what it wanted […] Hence its terror of dissent, which does 
not threaten its power but its integrity.26   
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In his response to this passage, Gould observes, “I doubt that one can separate Cav-
ell’s sense of his own genesis as a writer from his awareness of the war in Vietnam or 
of Nixon’s efforts to stay in power at the expense of the American Constitution.” The 
motif of individual perfectionist skeptical crisis — Cavell’s sense of his trajectory to 
becoming a writer — is here explicitly situated in the context of a wider national cri-
sis. As Gould puts it, “the sense of connection between his crisis and the nation’s is all 
but ubiquitous.” 27 It is the nature of this connection that places Cavell specifically in 
the American romantic tradition, though the national crisis of course suffused the 
work of his contemporaries, literary and otherwise.  
In The Senses of Walden, Cavell writes “the time of crisis depicted in this book 
is not alone a private one, and not wholly cosmic. It is simultaneously a crisis in the 
nation’s life. And the nation too must die down to the root if it is to continue to rec-
ognize and neighbour itself.” The narrator of Walden expresses a “mood at once of 
absolute hope and yet of absolute defeat, his own and the nation’s,” since “the nation, 
and the nation’s people, have yet to be well made.” This crisis is one, according to 
Cavell, for which Walden proposes the remedy of writing of a certain kind: “It would 
be a fair summary of the book’s motive to say that it invites us to take an interest in 
our lives, and teaches us how.”28 Through the writer’s and the reader’s mutual consti-
tution of one another’s voices in the process of reading and being read, the nation can 
be “reconstituted,” a goal Cavell hasn’t been shy of claiming for his own work, adding 
his own voice to the transcendentalist “chorus” as Thoreau’s inheritor.29 
In this way, the nation’s lack of identity with itself in his own times is linked 
for him with the crisis Thoreau perceived. Throughout his project, Cavell argues that 
there is an eclipsed “radical” intent and meaning behind words tarnished with 
(mis)use, or with forgetfulness, and of the power of such meanings if actually en-
acted. The above passage from “The Avoidance of Love” both comments on a con-
temporaneous 1960s radicalism, and posits another understanding of “radical”: a re-
turn to the nation’s root purpose, (re)infusing what has become rhetoric with its root 
meanings. Cavell’s suggestion is that a true American radicalism would be one that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27. Gould, review, http://olponline.org/2010/08/19/tim-gould-reviews-lawrence-rhus-
stanley-cavells-american-dream-previously-unpublished/. 
28. Cavell, The Senses of Walden: An Expanded Edition (1972; Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1981), 116, 9, 116, 67. 
29. Paul Anderson, “Agee After Cavell, Cavell After Agee,” Stanley Cavell, Literature, and 
Film: the Idea of America, ed. Andrew Taylor and Áine Kelly (New York: Routledge, 2013), 136. 
CONVERSATIONS 3  
 
59!
worked to realise the American project as conceived by earlier generations, specifi-
cally the transcendentalists: hatred of an America that has lost its way would thus 
stand as evidence of love for true American promise (an interpretation giving some 
weight to Sacvan Bercovitch’s hypothesis about the recuperative logic of American 
protest).30 This idea, that a radical American intellectual could be working in the ser-
vice of an “invisible republic” inside or under the extant one — despair figured as 
commitment to the dream, rather than a rebuttal of it — brings together romantic 
strains of the counterculture with the transcendentalist vision.31 While Cavell came to 
find a reanimation of Emerson’s perfectionist message in the American cinema of the 
1930s and 1940s, Thoreau was taken up by artists and thinkers in the 1960s as an ex-
ample of both political and spiritual resistance (as in the importance of his essay 
“Civil Disobedience” to groups like SDS). Thoreau was also an artistic inspiration in 
terms of experiential and everyday aesthetics, and we could speculate here about 
whether Cavell might have seen or been aware, for instance, of avant garde filmmaker 
Jonas Mekas’ film Walden: Diaries, Notes, and Sketches of 1969, an unedited video 
diary of his life in New York. 
Cavell speaks on several occasions of feeling generationally out of step, being 
too young during the Depression years to claim that era, missing his chance to join 
those who served in World War II, the so-called greatest generation (though only 
just, for reasons of health), and being somewhat older than the young radicals of the 
1960s. Indeed, it is this very issue of “partial identification,” he says, that informs his 
awareness that to say ‘we’ and speak on behalf of others is to make a “moral claim,” 
not simply to reflect a state of affairs.32 However, although his interest in the trans-
cendentalists is the most extensive and well documented aspect of his engagement 
with American writing, Cavell’s response to twentieth-century American writers is 
equally directed toward finding exemplars within the American scene who approach 
experience in same way he does. Hence while he famously reaches backwards to Em-
erson and Thoreau, he also makes examples of near contemporaries, including some 
who cast his own work in a slightly different light than it is perhaps usually con-
sidered. Cavell was based at UC Berkeley until 1962, where the Free Speech Move-
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ment erupted on campus in 1964, initiated by student activists who had taken part in 
the Freedom Summer and were agitating for civil rights. This is generally considered 
to have been a defining moment in the campus activism that subsequently took place 
all over the US.33 Cavell presents himself in Little Did I Know as differently placed to 
these protesting students. However, although they would later part ways ideologi-
cally, Berkeley’s student activists initially quoted Paul Goodman extensively, and 
Cavell too makes several telling references to Goodman, marking him as a candidate 
for inclusion in his American moral perfectionist canon. The question for Cavell isn’t 
only what the consequences of a mode of thinking that takes experience as a base 
might be, but what the consequences for American thought could be if it is American 
experience, specifically, that is its starting point. In this way, Goodman becomes an 
example for him as a potential teacher whose contribution hasn’t properly been 
heeded.  
Richard King suggests that Goodman (alongside Herbert Marcuse and Nor-
man O. Brown) could be considered among the “theorists of a second transcenden-
talist revolt,” with Goodman aligned with its more “utopian” wing.34 By claiming 
Goodman as one of his alternative educators — alternative to the tradition of analytic 
philosophy — Cavell draws a circle that encompasses elements of the counterculture 
alongside transcendentalism and film. Goodman’s work was a broad project of social 
criticism comprising questions of community, the innovation of Gestalt therapy, and 
queer activism, amongst other concerns. Investigations of the individual achievement 
of freedom, of education, and of what kind of country America should be, link him to 
the thematics of improvement and bildung. For Cavell, he is also linked with the po-
tential for American experience to make a useful contribution to the scene of national 
and indeed world culture.  
We might ask here how Cavell’s conception of the importance of experience 
differs from the 1960s exaltation of experience more generally. Goodman was chary 
of the Beats, and where the Beats’ stress on the importance of experience is often 
understood to have prized immediacy, spontaneity, and sensation, Cavell’s caution 
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about immediacy sets him too apart from them. Just as Cavell’s vision of community 
has something in common with that of the Hollywood film of the 1930s, his romantic 
sense of the importance of experience to self- and political development shares 
ground with articulations of this in the 1960s. But in addition to the crucial fact of his 
philosophical training, there is something belonging to neither era in Cavell’s com-
plex of influences, partly because the intellectual climate of the 1940s and 1950s re-
mains so important to it.  
Speaking of Goodman in the context of beginning teaching at Harvard, Cavell 
explains in his memoir that he found “little charm in analytical aesthetics.” By con-
trast, the “best or most influential recent literary critics in English [...] remained in-
comparably more interesting.”35 Several of the names Cavell cites here fall under the 
heading of ‘New Critics’. While the New Critics are exemplary for Cavell in certain re-
spects, they’re also lacking in key areas. Where they stressed aesthetic integrity, the 
New York intellectuals (among whom Goodman is often counted) highlighted social 
and cultural contexts, and Cavell has wished there could have been more commerce 
between these two. He has also suggested that the New Critics’ failure to include phi-
losophy in their intellectual programme paved the way for poststructuralism’s incur-
sions into American intellectual life, with the concomitant eclipse of America’s in-
digenous responses to the issues it raised.36 
Reiterating his point about the value of both Goodman and the New Critics in 
Little Did I Know, Cavell comments, “I wanted philosophy to take on such criticism, 
perhaps be taken on by it, not, as was mostly the case, to avoid it.”37 Not only did the 
New Critics fail to engage with philosophy, philosophy failed to engage with them. 
This is where the preoccupations I have been tracing return us to film. Cavell suggests 
that the remedy for America’s occlusion of philosophy might lie in film. America has 
generated a unique philosophy, Cavell argues, but lacks the tools with which to re-
cognise it. Analytic philosophy shares in this failure of recognition. And so, Cavell ex-
plains, “It was from this sense of pedagogical impasse that I came to the idea of ex-
perimenting with what could be said about film”: 
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Film had for me become essential in my relation to the arts generally […] 
There was, or I knew, comparatively little intellectual work to start from in the 
early 1960s […] Philosophers, it seemed, had almost without exception left the 
field alone […] oughtn’t the fact of this neglect itself inspire suspicion? Given 
my restiveness with philosophy’s treatment, or avoidance, or stylization, of 
human experience […] what better way to challenge the avoidance than 
through the worldwide phenomenon of cinema?38  
 
Cavell insists “on writing about philosophy and movies in the same breath, insisting 
on both of them, but especially on their conjunction, as part of my American intellec-
tual and cultural inheritance.”39 If film is one of Cavell’s teachers, what film has to 
teach has implications, for him, for understanding the American philosophical tradi-
tion, as well as throwing into relief the question of who, or what, has the authority to 
teach. And it potentially reverses the direction of influence between European intel-
lectual traditions and American ones. Like Emerson’s and Thoreau’s work viewed as 
philosophy, the best Hollywood film is not yet, for Cavell, fully culturally possessed, 
its significance not fully understood or owned. Likewise, Goodman and others (in-
cluding certain of the New Critics and the New York intellectuals) aren’t fully pos-
sessed. To possess them would be to gain access to the ways in which they mark out a 
path. Much of Cavell’s writing on film is involved in the task of undertaking this pos-
session, constructing a canon or alternative genealogy of texts, broadly defined, of 
American philosophical importance. The other claim here is that Hollywood film, 
alongside these examples, is another of the places that a native tradition of thinking 
through experience is expressed. 
If the ownership of experience is a step on the way to philosophical conscious-
ness, film thus helps to provide Cavell with a direction in philosophy that is specifi-
cally American. Since what Cavell conceives as the “American difference” in philoso-
phy is related, for him, to America’s search for itself, Hollywood film becomes, poten-
tially, part of the path toward America’s self-finding. While this kind of finding is the 
aspiration, a countervailing self-losing or self-forgetting is also a danger. For Cavell, 
one manner of averting this is through the activity of criticism. Since both an idea of 
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criticism, and of the role of experience in criticism, are worked out in Cavell’s ap-
proach to film, his choice of “companions” in this enterprise becomes significant. As 
we’ve seen, unusually for a philosopher, Cavell expresses a debt to practitioners of 
criticism, both cultural and aesthetic. The object isn’t criticised in isolation though. 
The critic’s life also comes into her criticism, partly because each film (or artwork) is 
seen at a specific time and place, as well as with other people.  
Cavell’s assertion that he didn’t read Walter Benjamin until the 1970s under-
scores the fact that his journey toward film scholarship was informed by untypical 
sources — his first book on film acknowledges a strain of influence deriving from 
Clement Greenberg (through his friend, the art historian Michael Fried), but not yet 
“The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” placing his work in an 
American intellectual nexus and circle of influence. His list of preferred American 
film critics, though, doesn’t include his near contemporary, the New Yorker reviewer 
Pauline Kael. In closing, I will explore their relation as a way into a broader point 
about Cavell’s sensibility. Kael was based in Berkeley at the same time as Cavell, and 
he credits her in his memoirs with providing part of his education in movies, enabling 
him to see European art house films among others. This is significant, since as we’ve 
seen, education in and by film is a weighty theme for him, and also because Kael’s 
own response to film reflects a cultural turning point.  
Cavell for his part connects Kael’s film screening enterprise in Berkeley with 
l’air du temps: 
 
Pauline Kael had converted a pair of adjacent small shops three blocks from 
Sather Gate – being the main pedestrian entrance to the Berkeley campus, the 
plaza Sather Gate opened onto became the site of the initial massive student 
demonstrations that will form in the spring of my first year of teaching back at 
Harvard — in effect into two screening rooms, showing different films and 
changing films more often than once a week, each room primitive in appoint-
ment […] but each with programs satisfying the advanced taste of the most so-
phisticated art house audience. It was a glorious span of education.40   
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The fact that Cavell personally attended Kael’s screenings might lead us to think 
that she influenced him importantly. Both bring elements of a West Coast perspec-
tive — if this can be characterised as a certain amount of irreverence for the propri-
ety of “culture” — to East Coast pursuits (Kael majored in Philosophy at Berkeley 
before becoming a critic), and there are interesting similarities between them. For 
Kael, as for Cavell, movies are objects of a love no less real for their being putatively 
suspect, and they offer a potential community that might “react as you do,” even 
when you are “[s]itting there alone or painfully alone” at the movies. Like Cavell, 
Kael often uses the first person plural, since “We’re not only educated people of 
taste, we’re also common people with common feelings. And our common feelings 
are not all bad.”41 And she shares Cavell’s perception of a tendency among Ameri-
cans not to think of American films as art. She feels there are special difficulties en-
tailed in being a critic of “mass culture,” and that one needs particular qualities in 
order to do it well.42 
But Cavell’s version of a democratic project, though it takes in popular culture, 
isn’t a populist one. His tastes in the arts aside from film belong to a distinct era, pre-
dating what we might think of as “postmodern.” And his specifically American cine-
matic preferences (as opposed to the European cinema he has written about) don’t 
accord with Kael’s. Kael’s film criticism embraced another mood than is aspired to in 
Cavell’s work; she admired the work of directors like Scorcese, Altman, and DePalma, 
the 1970s being to Kael as the 1930s and 1940s are to Cavell in terms of providing an 
American cinematic peak. Kael’s understanding of the democratic nature of movie 
viewing deliberately encompasses “low” or “trashy” pleasures. Cavell praises her for 
establishing film as “a body of work to be taken seriously,” but laments her “‘kiss, 
kiss, bang, bang’ sense” of what American film can do.43 It is Cavell, not Kael, who in-
sists that the movies themselves (at least the good ones) can be a measure for other 
arts to be held against. 
The nature of the movies, for Kael, is that they “took their impetus not from 
the desiccated imitation European high culture, but from the peep show, the Wild 
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West show, the music hall, the comic strip — from what was coarse and common.”44 
Cavell also points to the way that movies had their earliest origins in “popular or folk 
arts […] farce, melodrama, circus, music hall, romance.”45 But one of Cavell’s ques-
tions in dealing with movies is that of where, if anywhere, their moral dimension is 
located. While, then, Kael’s criticism forms part of the backdrop to Cavell’s education 
in valuing movies, he is placed differently. Cavell sees films as aesthetic objects where 
every detail counts. But he also finds in them a moral-political dimension. This di-
mension is differently defined by him than by, for example, Siegfried Kracauer, but 
Cavell doesn’t dismiss “moralising” intellectualism in the way that Kael does. Cavell, 
though younger, is still touched by, or close to, the seriousness of Kracauer’s genera-
tion (and even circle) of critics and criticism in a way Kael chose not to be. Although 
Kael can then be seen in some ways as one of Cavell’s educators, since she extended 
the range of film he was exposed to, they are separated not only training but by a cul-
tural shift.  
In The World Viewed, Cavell regrets that the movies, and movie-going, are 
“not what they were.” By the time of writing, he finds that he has “increasing diffi-
culty’ persuading himself to see new movies, in large part because the form of com-
panionship involved in moviegoing has changed, resulting in a sensation of attend-
ance ‘at a cult.”46 Kael’s essay “Trash, Art, and the Movies” was published in Harper’s 
in 1969. There, Kael speaks of the movies as a response to lostness. She identifies a 
pervasive anomie reflected by cinema that paradoxically creates a (disenchanted) 
kind of movie-going community:  
 
Like those cynical heroes who were idealists before they discovered that the 
world was more rotten than they had been led to expect, we’re just about all of 
us displaced persons, “a long way from home.” […] that home no longer exists. 
But there are movie houses. In whatever city we find ourselves we can duck 
into a theater and see on the screen our familiars — our old “ideals” aging as 
we are and no longer looking so ideal. Where could we better stoke the fires of 
our masochism than at rotten movies in gaudy seedy picture palaces in cities 
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that run together, movies and anonymity a common denominator. Movies — a 
tawdry corrupt art for a tawdry corrupt world — fit the way we feel.47 
 
National political contexts for disenchantment are no doubt important here, but the 
issue by 1969 is also one for Kael of overfamiliarity with cinematic conventions, and 
an arrival at irony; an aesthetic change, whereby the movies’ embrace of trashiness 
seems apt.  
I hope I have begun to illustrate earlier in this paper that Cavell draws together 
experiential and liberal themes with American romanticism, a confluence that can to 
an extent be seen as shared in and informed by a context. But I would also like to 
highlight that his emplacement within that context remains highly particular. His 
mixing of romantic hope and liberal disappointment, alongside his debts to existen-
tialism and phenomenological philosophy, seem to locate him in time, alongside the 
youth of the 1960s. Cavell’s aesthetic preferences, though, are a point of dissimilarity 
with the counterculture, especially as these were to be expressed by the time of the 
1970s “New Hollywood” cinema Kael championed. Further, although he shares 
ground with this milieu, Cavell’s sensibility, as I’ve mentioned, is importantly shaped 
by the aesthetic and intellectual mores of the preceding decades. Cavell’s affinities 
with the American intellectual and artistic culture of the 1960s, though I would sug-
gest that these do exist, thus occur at a particular angle of inflection. 
By way of concluding, I would like to return to the thematics of hope and des-
pair. While there are other reasons Cavell doesn’t find Kael an entirely companion 
spirit in her response to film, one facet of their divergence is tonal. Owing to its Em-
ersonian inflections, the development of Cavell’s work on Hollywood cinema over the 
course of his career has moved towards its consideration in terms of potential for an 
improved sociality (he explains that the idea of remarriage comedy, with its onus on 
the “second chance,” coalesced for him around 1974). The mood of New Hollywood 
cinema and neo-noir is rather one of disillusion and even dissolution, where com-
munity seems distinctly frangible. We have arrived in our current critical moment at 
a further turn of the wheel than that of Kael’s era, where for some, a disenchanted 
mood, and the aesthetics of irony in general, no longer seem productive. In the search 
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for alternative kinds of tone, as this impetus is manifested for example in my own 
field, literary studies, both Emersonian ethics and a Thoreauvian model of attention 
have increasingly become a focus. This return to the transcendentalists (often directly 
via Cavell), and a renewed emphasis on experience now, may bring a submerged his-
torical context in its wake.  
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The “War,” the “Troops,” and  
the Grammar of “Support” 





Not too long ago, at a lighthearted social gathering, I stumbled into a conversation on 
the United States’ martial presence in the Middle East. The person with whom I 
spoke is a friend of a friend, a young man with a military background. I do not share 
these ties. We were struggling to find our feet with one another. And despite our best 
efforts at civility, our talk was taking a turn for the tense. 
When we sensed that a skirmish was about to ensue, the young man moved for 
a preemptive termination: “Don’t you support our troops?” he asked. It is difficult to 
tell whether his question sought my agreement or my capture. The latter possibility of 
seizure and subjection registers the customary force and effect of the locution, “Sup-
port our troops.” Often, to use this expression is to refuse to participate in certain dis-
cussions (if not to prevent a dialogue from even getting off the ground). In these 
cases, the phrase works to intimidate, threatening discredit or worse to those who 
pursue particular topics.1 The former possibility of parley and accord points to a more 
charitable reading. In this light, the young man’s question becomes a diplomatic ges-
ture — an attempt to bridge the gap or, at least, to keep the peace. A suitable transla-
tion might be, “Very well, you do not support our government’s foreign policy; do you 
at least support the soldiers who serve our country, the men and women who labor to 
protect you, the U.S. civilian?” This could be the starting point for an exchange, one 
to be continued in perhaps a more appropriate arena. Of course, the criteria of ap-
propriateness for the circumstances and parties of such an exchange remain flexible, 
open to projection and to debate.2 
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Regardless of whether it was a denial or an invitation, his question at that 
moment laid several options before me. Decorum pressed me to say, “Yes.” My 
younger, more careless self might have tagged on a mocking “Sir” to this “Yes” — 
might have even thrown down an emphatic “No.” My older, humbler self might have 
rested on candor, electing to pause, look the man in the eye, turn up my palms, and 
say, “I don’t know.” What I in fact did — as I often do when I lose my social bearings 
— was attempt to be clever: “How exactly does one oppose the troops?” I asked in re-
turn. 
The military man smiled. This appeared to be the end of the matter. The more 
I think about his reaction, the more it strikes me as a merciful one. He rightly could 
have dismissed my reply for what it was: an evasion of a question that was asked seri-
ously. And even if I could not have refrained from responding to his question with 
another question, I could have reoriented our conversation with the right question: 
“What do you mean by ‘support?’” — or, better still, “What do you mean by ‘sup-
port?’” But each of us could feel the discomfort of the audience that was gathering 
around our discussion. To prolong it, we knew, would be indecorous.3  
The substance of our exchange lodged in my mind like a splinter. I kept revisit-
ing it, turning it over, playing out alternative endings, trying to soothe its irritations. 
To be sure, the expression “support our troops” has never sat well with me. But my 
conversation with this man revealed linguistic and ethical entanglements that I had 
not yet recognized. I recalled Noam Chomsky’s criticism of the phrase. It fell short of 
untying these knots. Even so, testing Chomsky’s position may be a productive gambit: 
[…] the point of public relations slogans like “support our troops” is that they don’t 
mean anything […] that’s the whole point of good propaganda: you want to create a 
slogan that nobody is going to be against and I suppose everybody will be for because 
nobody knows what it means because it doesn’t mean anything, but its crucial value is 
it diverts your attention from a question that does mean something — “Do you sup-
port our policy?” — and that’s the one you’re not allowed to talk about.4 
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very well say that a difficult conversation such as this one is seldom if ever harmonious with the nice-
ties of a polite gathering — and that we have a (civic) responsibility to have it out anyway. Still, I think 
it fair to admit that if we insist on fulfilling this responsibility at every opportunity, we may find our-
selves no longer attending many parties. 
4. Noam Chomsky, “On Propaganda: Noam Chomsky Interviewed by Unidentified Inter-
viewer, WBAI, January 1992,” Chomsky.Info: The Noam Chomsky Website, accessed July 5, 2014, 
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There is little doubt that people have used the utterance “support our troops” 
propagandistically. It can distract its audience from grave and crucial details. It can 
confuse the details themselves.  But to say that it doesn’t mean anything rings false. 
When we resist polemics and listen to people such as that young man, other uses of 
the phrase — applications that exceed the conceptual boundaries of propaganda — 
may show themselves. Even if they do not, our willingness to continue speaking, to go 
on with one another, depends upon our abilities to attend thoroughly and precisely to 
why someone has been tempted to take language “on holiday.”5  
These uses mark the coordinates for an important inquiry. What can the 
statement “I support the troops” accomplish, even when it proves to be senseless? 
Under what circumstances can one say, “I support the troops, but not the war,” and 
mean it? What must any of us mean in saying that we support the soldiers who fight 
our country’s wars?  
In asking what the expression “support our troops” not only means, but also 
does in concrete situations, I call for the methods of ordinary language philosophy. 
These methods moor our understanding of a word or concept to the context of its 
application and the history of its use.  What I referred to above as the right ques-
tion — “What do you mean by ‘support?’” — similarly summons the approaches of 
ordinary language philosophy: this query arises from the sort of entanglements 
that occur when we employ or analyze a sign without a clear view of its history in 
situated speech-acts. Cavell describes the nature of this confusion with a vital dis-
tinction: 
 
[Wittgenstein] undertook, as I read him, to trace […] the ways in which […] we 
are led to speak “outside language games,” consider expressions apart from, and 
in opposition to, the natural forms of life which give those expressions the force 
they have […]. What is left out of an expression if it is used “outside its ordinary 
language game” is not necessarily what the words mean (they may mean what 
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http://www.chomsky.info/interviews/199201--.htm. For the sake of clarity, I have altered this tran-
script’s punctuation. 
5. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Rev. 4th ed., trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, 
P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte, ed. P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte (Malden: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2009), §38: “philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday.” Cf. Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, trans. Peter Winch, ed. Georg Henrik von Wright (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1984), 56e: “Don’t for heaven’s sake, be afraid of talking nonsense! But you must 
pay attention to your nonsense.” 
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they always did, what a good dictionary says they mean), but what we mean in 
using them when and where we do. The point of saying them is lost.6 
 
Talking nonsense has less to do with an utterance’s semantic content, less even to do 
with an utterance’s pragmatic implications, and more to do with “our confused rela-
tion to the words” we are uttering.7 Cavell sheds light on what most disturbed me 
when recalling my conversation with the military man. In response to his question of 
whether I support the troops, I could have answered in the affirmative without en-
tirely feigning conviction. Still, I would have done so with puzzlement and unease — 
not because I do not know what “support” means, but because I do not know what I 
would mean in saying it there and then. I would be lost with my words. 
 Thus, in order to survey the grammar of “support,” we need to review not only 
its denotations, but also the everyday circumstances in which we say that we support 
someone.8 We say that we support people when we espouse their actions or enter-
prises. In this sense, to say, “I support the troops, but not the war,” is to contradict 
oneself. This contradiction becomes less obvious when we speak of supporting people 
in terms of their principles. We can embrace certain aspects of a military ethos — the 
virtues of honor, courage, and loyalty, for instance — but here we are not supporting 
the troops so much as supporting the values that they strive to embody. We say that 
we support people when we provide sustenance or the means to an end. These re-
sources can be psychological — a boost of morale or a show of solidarity. Generating 
this form of support is arguably the basic purpose of the “Support Our Troops” slogan 
with its color-coded ribbons. (For those who use the motto with this intent — say, 
people whose loved ones are soldiers — it is difficult to see this function as propagan-
distic.) The resources we supply can also be physical or financial. In this sense, every 
taxpayer in the United States supports the troops. However, as recent events have 
shown, even this support may be mislaid once “our troops” become “our veterans.”9 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6. Cavell, The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), 207. 
7. James Conant, “Wittgenstein on Meaning and Use,” in Philosophical Investigations 21:3 
(1998), 247-8. 
8. I acknowledge, in the contexts of “Drone Warfare” and the so-called “War on Terror,” 
grammatical investigations of “troops” and “war” are likewise in order. But in the interests of brevity, I 
limit my remarks to “support.” 
9. The fiscal realities of “supporting the troops” call to mind the issues of “tacit consent” that 
Cavell discusses in relation to theories of the social contract à la Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau (Cf. Stan-
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Let us summarize. We can support people by standing beside their words and 
their deeds, although standing beside someone does not entail our agreement. We 
can support people by providing resources, mental or material, with or without stipu-
lations. And is there not a larger range of diverse, yet interrelated examples? Our in-
terpersonal lives show us that support can come in countless forms: listening to 
someone and offering advice; listening to someone and refraining from offering ad-
vice; helping someone to avoid an error; allowing someone to commit an error and to 
learn from it; forgiving someone for an error when s/he acknowledges it; forgiving 
someone even in the absence of confession and contrition.   
Admittedly, these latter significations do not constitute the conventional use of 
the expression “support our troops.” They are not yet part of its history. For those 
who would like to see the phrase deployed in these ways, it falls to those language-
users to make it so, to justify new applications to a language-community, to extend 
the expression’s history with a new story. In following Wittgenstein’s guidance, we 
would initiate this process by locating the heimat — the home, native land, or home-
land — of the phrase “support our troops” and of the word “support”: “When philoso-
phers use a word […] and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask 
oneself: is the word ever used this way in the language in which it is at home 
[Heimat]? What we do is bring [führen, “lead”] words back from their metaphysical 
to their everyday use.”10 The phrase “support our troops” may be at home in its use to 
silence dissent, but this use hinges on employing the word “support” in a way that is 
conceptually confused and, to some extent, exiled from its heimat. This sort of exile 
or expatriation can occur with remarkable ease — indeed, disquietingly so, as the ease 
of estrangement is often proportional to the difficulty of returning. To rediscover the 
native lands of our words, we must practice what Cavell characterizes as a kind of 
“shepherding”: 
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ley Cavell, Cities of Words: Pedagogical Letters on a Register of the Moral Life (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2004), 49-69; Cf. Cavell, Claim of Reason, 22-8). Fittingly, Cavell recalls a similarly 
questionable slogan, “Love it [America], or Leave it,” to illustrate the (also questionable) idea “that when 
you express dissent from some action of your government you are withdrawing from membership in so-
ciety and the protection of its laws” (64). There is far more to be said here with respect to civic engage-
ment and civil disobedience. For instance, even citizens who vehemently protest their government’s poli-
cies can be seen as consenting to those policies inasmuch as they participate in and benefit from public 
services. Whether they should be seen as such––in what way, to what degree, under what circumstances, 
and so on––are inherently disputable concerns. Suffice it to say that we need not conflate “support” with 
“consent,” however much one may overlap with the other in particular cases. 
10. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §116. 
CONVERSATIONS 3  
 
73!
It would a little better express my sense of Wittgenstein’s practice if we trans-
late the idea of bringing words back as leading them back, shepherding them; 
which suggests not only that we have to find them, to go to where they have 
wandered, but that they will return only if we attract and command them, 
which will require listening to them. But the translation is only a little better, 
because the behavior of words is not something separate from our lives, those 
of us who are native to them, in mastery of them. The lives themselves have to 
return.11 
 
To shepherd our words back home, we have to “attract and command them,” and we 
do this by “listening to them,” allowing them to show us where and how and why they 
have alienated themselves from reality. And since our words are inextricable from our 
lives, we therein shepherd ourselves back to reality, back down to earth, “back to the 
rough ground.”12 The roughness is at once our source of mobility and of difficulty — 
of traction and of drag, as it were. It is, at bottom, the only livable habitation we have. 
So think of the person who urges his or her fellow citizens to “support the troops.” 
This person may be a U.S. soldier. S/he may be a relative or friend of a U.S. soldier. 
(And s/he may even nurse a fair amount of ambivalence regarding the U.S. military’s 
customs and operations.) If one opposes this institution and its activities, how does 
one begin to respond to this person — begin to be responsive to this person — with-
out a bad-faith affirmation? It is unlikely that any productive conversation 
would ensue if one were to begin by castigating this person for using an inane expres-
sion with a propagandistic history. (Yet it has to be said, when someone uses this 
phrase to avoid or deny genuine dialogue, exposing it as such a move may be just the 
right place to begin.) The ordinary language philosopher as shepherd would first have 
to attend to the grammar of support in this person’s life — would thus have to attend 
to this person (a form of acknowledgment).13 S/he may even find that this person is 
using “support” to mean something like love or forgiveness. The ordinary language 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11. Stanley Cavell, “Declining Decline,” in This New Yet Unapproachable America: Lectures 
after Emerson after Wittgenstein (Albuquerque: Living Batch Press, 1989), 34-5. Cf. Stanley Cavell, 
“The Wittgensteinian Event,” in Philosophy the Day after Tomorrow (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2005), 194-9. 
12. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §107. 
13. My emphases on attention are indebted to the teaching of Toril Moi in her Fall 2014 semi-
nar on ordinary language philosophy and literary theory. Her forthcoming book on the subject should 
stimulate conversation for years to come.!
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shepherd would have to start there, in a particular zone of exile, before leading the 
flock back to a shared home — back to a common ground where the dangers of using 
“support” are recognized and where “love” and “forgiveness” are seen as more salu-
tary alternatives. Leading language back to its homeland can thus be a crucial 
means of recreating the homeland itself. There will be cases when we want to use 
“support” and bring its full sweep of meaning into play. And there will be cases in 
which these meanings begin to muddle and mislead us, such that it is preferable to 
employ different words and concepts altogether. Despite my efforts to renovate “sup-
port,” I am inclined to take the latter course of action in the context of the U.S. mili-
tary. For if I am asked again, “Do you support our troops?” I feel I could only say, “I 
am a United States citizen,” which is to say, “With our troops, I share citizenship.” My 
life as a civilian is constitutively connected to their lives as soldiers. We are account-
able to and responsible for one another. 
